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ABSTRACT 
There is significant complexity in digital forensics due to the numerous device 
types and device implementations.  This complexity is exacerbated by the need for 
digital evidence to be understood by a wide variety of stakeholders with varying 
technical backgrounds. 
This study showed the utility of using software engineering Unified Modeling 
Language (UML) modeling techniques for addressing this complexity.  Extensible, 
executable models for the digital forensics domain were developed depicting the 
relevant computational mechanisms involved in the who, what, when, where and how 
attributes of digital evidence creation.   
Artifacts generated from the executable models enable a systematic 
constructive methodology utilizing the principle of abstraction and pattern discovery 
to provide a top-down view of the commonalities across implementations.  It was 
demonstrated that the abstracted, top-down view was equivalent to implementation 
specific detailed views.  In addition, it was shown that the executable model artifacts 
could be used by software applications to illustrate the creation of digital forensic 
evidence at various levels of detail. 
Lastly, a profile was constructed to extend UML with digital forensic domain 
relevant concepts and vocabulary to help enable forensic domain stakeholders, who 
may not have a software engineering background, to apply modeling to digital 
forensics.  The UML profile and the defined constructive methodology provided 
concrete artifacts to assist others in the future to develop digital forensic models. 
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CHAPTER 1 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
There is significant complexity in digital forensics.  Digital forensic analysis is 
performed on devices which are complicated systems that contain a large number of 
components between which can exist a practically uncountable number of interactions.  
Devices can be composed of different component types and component 
implementations.  In addition, there could be multiple devices involved in a digital 
forensic scenario.  This complexity is exacerbated by the fact that digital evidence 
needs to be understood by a wide variety of stakeholders with varying technical 
backgrounds. 
This problem space is analogous to the development and maintenance of 
software systems.  Software systems can be incredibly complex, consisting of software 
applications and components that can have multiple implementations and practically 
uncountable interactions.  Like forensic digital devices, software systems also have 
stakeholders with varying technical backgrounds.  Thus, the question becomes: can 
software engineering approaches be applied to digital forensics to assist in managing 
digital forensic complexities?  
In fact, most forensic devices and components are implemented by software.   
So, it was reasonable to explore whether modeling techniques used on software 
systems would apply to digital forensics. 
Models can facilitate the development of views, techniques, and tools, which 
can enhance the understandability of evidence in computational devices.  Tools 
implemented as software applications can utilize models to abstract relevant 
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information to support multiple stakeholder viewpoints. Models can be extended to 
address both existing and future implementations of the devices and components that 
comprise the systems on which digital forensics are performed.  Models can facilitate 
the discovery of common implementation patterns across different device 
implementations.  These patterns can be utilized as a means of simplifying domain 
complexities that are reflected in abstracted top-level models.  The identification of 
patterns also facilitates the development of domain-specific model profiles to describe 
the system being modeled in the terminology of the domain stakeholders.  The model 
profile can then be utilized to support future model development by the domain 
stakeholder.   
The top-level model needs to evolve over time to address additional 
implementations as new devices or versions of devices are introduced.  The profile 
also needs to be extended to address additional forensic use-cases, as required. 
This chapter introduces forensic complexities and software engineering 
modeling.  The problem statement is documented through a discussion of the ways in 
which modeling can address digital modeling complexities.  Lastly, research 
questions, the hypothesis, and objectives are identified.   
 
1.1 Overview forensics 
In digital forensics, stakeholders are concerned with understanding the who, 
what, where, when, and how attributes of digital evidence.  They need to know what 
evidence is available and where to look for it.  In addition, they need to know, from a 
timeline perspective, when the evidence was created and, if possible, who created it.  
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Also, to defend the validly of the digital evidence, it is important to know how the 
evidence was created and how it could be changed.   
To be able to answer these questions, the stakeholders need to have an 
understanding of how digital evidence is created on a device to the appropriate level of 
abstraction (e.g., detail) for their role (see Table 1-1).  To do this, they need to 
understand the computational mechanisms, the device’s relevant underlying 
component data structures and the operations performed on these data structures.  For 
example, an analyst needs a deep understanding of the underlying computational 
mechanisms of the device to address all aspects of the evidence and to ensure that their 
conclusions are defensible.  A witness needs to understand how the evidence relates to 
a case, but only needs to understand the computational mechanisms of the device to 
the level that they have confidence in the validity of the evidence.   
 
Table 1-1.  Stakeholders Roles 
Stakeholder Role Level of Understanding Required 
Digital Forensic 
Analysis 
Requires expert level understanding of digital forensics to 
determine what information is available and how to 
recover the information. 
Lawyer/forensic 
expert testimony 
Strong level of understanding to convey important 
concepts to a lay audience and to defend analyst results. 
Juror Understand the concepts to aide decision making.  May 
have minimal technical background. 
Educator Strong level of understanding of the concepts to teach 
others. 
Student Learning concepts.  Depending on context, may or may not 
have strong technical expertise. 
Law Enforcement  Understand concepts to ensure complete and reliable 
collection of data.  May have minimal technical 
background. 
 
Digital forensic investigations tend to be complex in that they can include 
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numerous computational device types implemented by multiple components, with 
each component potentially having multiple implementations (see Figure 1-1).  In the 
context of this dissertation, a device is a computer-based system (e.g., computers, 
tablets, phones, etc.).  Devices are composed of components (e.g., applications, 
operating systems, file systems, network connections, etc.).  Components may be 
implemented in numerous ways (e.g., operating systems (OS) can by Windows, Linux, 
MAC, etc.; files systems can be FAT, NTFS, EXT; etc.).   
 
Figure 1-1.  Implementations 
 
There is additional complexity in that a device is not static, but rather has 
dynamic behavior that is significant in understanding the creation of evidence.  
Devices interact with users and other devices, and components within a device interact 
with other components.  This research focused on the modeling of devices, device 
components, and the interactions of the device components. 
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1.2 Overview of software engineering models 
Software models capture both the static and dynamic (e.g., behavioral) design 
aspects of a system.  A formal model is computationally rigorous and can be directly 
utilized in both the development and runtime aspects of applications.  A model 
provides an abstraction of the system.   
Software modeling has been used for several decades to address software 
complexity.  The Unified Modeling Language (UML) is the graphical modeling 
language that is widely accepted in the software community.  UML provides a means 
to model both static and dynamic behaviors of the system.  UML can address both 
software and hardware in systems.    
UML provides a formalism such that the model’s graphical depiction is 
consistent with an underlying mathematical basis.  UML-based models can be 
constrained so that they are unambiguous, which allows models to be internally 
consistent and executable as a programming language.  Through model execution, the 
model behavior can be observed and recorded. 
UML modeling utilizes principles, such as abstraction, to address complexity.  
Abstraction ensures that only the important details necessary for a particular 
stakeholder are addressed.  In addition, UML can also be used to identify common 
structural and behavior patterns of the system being modeled.  This is beneficial since 
one representation of an implementation is less complex than having multiple unique 
representations of the same underlying device or component functionality. 
UML utilizes object oriented terminology and software engineering concepts, 
which can be a barrier for individuals without a software background.  To address this, 
a profile can be created to extend UML to address a domain (i.e., a specified sphere of 
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activity or knowledge). The profile allows for a system to be modeled with concepts 
and terminology familiar to a domain stakeholder.  As an example, a widely accepted 
UML profile for system engineering is the System Modeling Language (SYSML).  
SYSML is used by numerous industries (e.g., auto, railway, defense, etc.).   This work 
explored using UML profiles for the digital forensic domain. 
 
1.3 Problem statement 
There is significant complexity in digital forensics due the numerous possible 
device types and device implementations.  This complexity is exacerbated by the need 
for digital evidence to be understood by a wide variety of stakeholders with varying 
technical backgrounds. 
 
How does modeling address the problem?  Software modeling techniques can 
help address the problem of digital forensic complexity by providing an understanding 
of the underlying computational mechanisms involved in the creation of evidence, 
providing a top-level view that shows that which is common across implementations 
and facilitating the development of applications to assist in the understanding of 
digital forensic concepts. 
Models can be used as a means to formally document the key computational 
mechanisms that are involved in digital evidence creation.  Models can be shared and 
evolved by digital forensic practitioners.  Since the model requires specific formal 
notations, it allows for non-ambiguous descriptions.  The model can also become an 
authenticated source to the community.  Models need to be extensible so that they can 
change overtime.  For example the model may need to increase the level of abstraction 
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(i.e., model fidelity) for an analyst stakeholder investigating an aspect of a 
computational mechanism.  Models are extensible and will be able to address a new 
implementations, new forensic categories, new devices, and new evidence creation 
use-cases.   
Using abstraction to reduce complexity is a concept that is commonly used in 
software engineering.  Since digital forensics is accomplished on software-based 
systems, it is reasonable to assume that this concept is applicable to the digital 
forensics domain to manage the complexity of the combinatorically explosive number 
of implementation configurations.  The premise behind the use of abstraction is that it 
is often easier to understand a general concept than to understand all the 
implementation details.  In addition, common structural and behavioral patterns can be 
identified from implementation specific models and used to construct an abstract top-
level model. A top-level model can provide one representation for several 
implementations by identifying that which is common across unique implementations 
and abstracting out the details.    
Applications are regularly available in many fields and domains as a learning 
mechanisms.  Models can be utilized to facilitate the development and runtime aspects 
of applications.  Making learning applications more available in the digital forensic 
field can only help in facilitating understandability. 
Top-level models and digital forensic learning applications can both represent 
different levels of abstraction.  This potentially allows for the needs of all potential 
digital forensic stakeholder to be addressed. Lastly, profiles can more readily make 
software modeling techniques available to digital forensic practitioners.   
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1.4 Research questions and objectives 
The questions to be answered in this study were: 
1. Can it be shown that there are commonalities in the device and component 
implementations on which digital forensics are based? 
2. Is there utility in applying software engineering modeling techniques to 
digital forensics in terms of managing complexity and in promoting 
understandability?     
3. If so, is there a potential approach in applying software modeling 
holistically across the digital forensic domain? 
The first question was addressed in this work by answering the following question: 
 Can implementation commonalty be identified and measured? 
The second question was addressed in this work by answering these questions: 
 Can models be used to create top-level generalized diagrams? 
 Can models facilitate digital forensic learning applications? 
 
The third question was addressed in this work by answering these questions: 
 How can models be holistically applied to the digital forensics domain? 
 Can modeling be more accessible to digital forensic stakeholders to reduce 
the need of software engineering skill sets? 
 
This work hypothesized that there are commonalities in the implementation of 
the components and devices on which digital forensics are performed and that this 
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implementation commonality along with software engineering modeling approaches 
can be applied to address digital forensic complexities.   To address the hypothesis, the 
four specific objectives of this study were: 
 Objective 1: Address domain complexity by utilizing model artifacts to 
facilitate the development of applications for learning and analysis that 
support multiple digital forensic stakeholder roles.  
 Objective 2: Address domain complexity by providing a top-down view 
and to find commonality patterns across implementations. 
 Objective 3:  Show the extensibility of models to address the introduction 
of different implementations and different implementation types.  
 Objective 4:  Construct a digital forensic domain specific UML Profile for 
digital evidence creation that can be used for future modeling efforts. 
1.5 Contributions of this work 
This work identified a unique approach to extend software modeling into the 
digital forensic domain by focusing on digital forensic complexities.  Numerous 
contributions resulted:  
1. Modeled the computational mechanisms involved in the creation of digital 
forensic evidence, 
2. Generated computable model artifacts to facilitate the execution of a digital 
forensic relevant animation application, 
3. Identified a process to construct top-level implementation views of 
computational mechanisms, 
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4. Identified modeling patterns to catalog commonalties in computational 
mechanisms, 
5. Identified metrics to support commonality and abstraction analysis, and 
6. Introduced a digital forensic profile along with a process to extend the profile. 
 
By modeling the underlying computational mechanisms, insight and understanding 
can be gained on how evidence is created, which would be beneficial to domain 
stakeholders.  The computational mechanisms were both statically and behaviorally 
modeled, and as a result, the model could be executed and model behavior captured.  
The captured model behavior can be parsed which allows algorithms to be written to 
utilize the captured behavior to facilitate digital forensic applications.  In the case of 
this work, the captured model artifacts were utilized to generate a script for an 
animation application.  The animation application could be used as a teaching aide.   
Digital forensics tends to be a bottom-up process in that evidence gathering 
procedures focus on specific implementations.  This work introduces a top-down 
approach which utilizes commonalities across implementations.  The top-level models 
and associated top-down views, are more abstract than the implementation models and 
will provide alternate approaches in addressing digital forensics complexities. 
 Patterns were utilized to identify commonalities across the computational 
mechanisms being modeled.  The identification of patterns was utilized to determine 
the degree of commonality in the different implementations of the computational 
mechanisms being modeled.   In addition, the patterns can be reused in other modeling 
efforts and were also utilized to construct this works top-level models. 
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Commonality and abstraction measures developed for this work provide a 
means of quantifying commonality between models and levels of abstraction between 
models. These metrics were utilized to assess potential relationships between these 
model and implementation properties. 
 Lastly, this work identified an initial digital forensic for the computational 
mechanisms which are the subject of this study.  The profile identifies a set of 
modeling elements which define the model elements which are relevant to the 
vocabulary and concepts of the digital forensic domain.  A process on how to extend 
the profile was also defined.   
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CHAPTER 2 
2 REVIEW OF THE LITERTURE  
 
The validity of digital forensic data can be subject to significant scrutiny, such 
as the highly publicized Anthony murder case in which the digital forensics tools 
provided contradictory results [1] [2].  There is a critical need to train computer 
forensic professionals to properly gather all relevant evidence and to have the staff to 
process evidence in a timely manner [3].  The most significant challenge in digital 
forensics is the lack of qualified people and recommended the development of new 
tools and capabilities [4].   
Visualization techniques can be used to enhance learning and understanding.  
Visualization has been used in addressing information that might be of interest in 
forensic investigations [5].  Visualization has been also specifically used for 
understanding of digital forensic information [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11]. 
UML is often used to facilitate application development as illustrated in [12].  
Digital forensics investigations are performed on software-based devices that utilize 
standard computer architectures.  Therefore, software engineering modeling 
techniques are also available to the digital forensics domain.  
Models manage complexity by formally capturing both the static and dynamic 
design aspects of a system.  A formal model is computationally rigorous and can be 
directly utilized in both the development and runtime aspects of applications.  A 
model provides an abstraction of the system.  Abstraction removes detail to allow a 
higher level view through which to facilitate understanding [13].  Model abstraction 
needs to provide the level of detail required to address the generalized attributes that 
are of interest, in this case the digital evidence attribute.  
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 Patterns in software engineering are utilized to make designs more efficient by 
reusing common design approaches [14].  Patterns are documented with artifacts such 
as UML class, object, and sequence diagrams.  An approach to specify UML patterns 
was discussed in [15].  Additionally, [16] discussed pattern types and how patterns can 
be utilized in developing domain-specific models.    
UML is a widely accepted software modeling approach and is an Object 
Management Group (OMG) standard [17].  UML can be used to model both static and 
dynamic aspects of software.  Model Driven Architecture (MDA) utilizes UML to 
support design by providing capabilities such as model execution and model 
transformation (e.g., code generation).   Models can be executed, similar to code, on 
model virtual machines to simulate model behaviors utilizing frameworks that are 
based on the OMG Foundational UML [18] and OMG Action Language to 
Foundational UML (ALF) standard [19] [20].  An example of an equivalent modeling 
framework implementation is eXecutable Translatable UML [21].  Executable models 
are of significant importance to this research since they allow the actual behaviors of 
the modeled device/device components to be captured and utilized by applications.   
UML profiles are a mechanism for extending UML to reflect the terminology 
and concepts of a particular domain.  UML profiles provide a concise dialect that 
consists of stereotypes (i.e., new model meta-elements), tags (e.g., attributes) and 
constraints that are support by UML compliant tools [22].  The stereotypes and tags 
capture domain terminology/concepts.  Object Constraint Language (OCL) rules are 
utilized to define the constraints, which are used to provide additional model precision 
and can be used for model validation.  OCL is an extension of UML [23] that can 
  
14 
 
formally specify UML.   
Software engineering metrics have been developed for objected oriented 
software systems [24].  Examples of software reuse metrics are seen in [25].  
 
Modeling and formalism in digital forensics and cyber security.  In addressing 
modeling in digital forensics, it is useful to also look at how modeling is used in cyber 
security.  The cyber security domain is directly related to the digital forensics domain 
in that the underling systems to be investigated or analyzed are computer systems that 
are based on similar technical concepts at similar levels of abstraction.  In the digital 
forensic use-case, the analysis is reasoning about the existence of digital forensic 
evidence on the computer system, whereas in the cyber security use-case, the focus is 
on computer system security vulnerabilities. 
Although there are a number of papers devoted to the use of formalism in 
digital forensics and cyber security, they have a different focus than the model 
proposed from this work.  There is a significant amount of literature recommending 
the use of modeling in digital forensics to formally model the digital forensic process 
[26] [27] [28] [29] [30]. 
The formalism of modeling can be utilized algorithmically to reason about the 
system being modeled.  A Turing Machine-Based model to address evidence is 
identified in [31].  A modeling method for forensic analysis formally using graphs to 
address attack vulnerabilities is discussed in [32].  The use of modeling for the 
analysis of evidence in storage media is introduced in [33]. 
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Garfinkel [34] defined a limited XML schema to formally capture forensic 
case information.  The intent of the schema was to provide an Application 
Programmer Interface (API) for digital forensic tools to share data sets. 
The cyber security modeling focus is on identifying system vulnerabilities and 
identifying likely attack scenarios [35] [36].  These models incorporated aspects of the 
underlying system architecture and in some cases also included a model of the human 
element.  A method to extend UML to address security concerns has been introduced 
in [37].  
Another aspect of formalism are Domain Specific Languages (DSL), tailored 
programming languages in which domain lexica and concepts are built into the 
language.  DSLs containing digital forensics and cyber security constructs are to be or 
have been developed [38] [39] [40] [41].  
Domain Specific Model Languages (DSML) is a model-based approach 
analogous to DSLs, but at a higher level of abstraction.  DSMLs are targeted for 
domain stakeholders and provide an abstract generic model instead of a specific 
programming language implementation.  Like DSL models, DSML models can also be 
directly executed or compiled to provide a transformation to other artifacts utilizing 
MDA techniques.  UML profiles have a strong relationship to DSMLs and information 
between UML profiles and DSMLs can be interchanged [42] and profiles can be used 
as a mechanism to design DSMLs [43].  
In the cyber security realm utilizing profiles to incorporated security patterns is 
discussed in [44].  The utilization of security patterns for development of more cyber 
resilient systems is addressed in [45] [46].  Fernandez and Petrie [47] suggested that 
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UML and security patterns can be used as a mechanism to teach secure system design.  
An example of the utilization of a pattern in digital forensics to isolate forensically 
interesting network data was reported by [48].    
 
Modeling in other domains: System Engineering Modeling Language (SysML).  A 
significant example of extending UML for other disciplines is seen in the System 
Modeling Language (SysML).  SysML is a profile extension of UML with a focus on 
system engineering of complex systems and system-of-systems through their 
lifecycles.  SysML has been applied to complex systems in many industries, including 
aircraft, automotive, defense, IT, medicine, and space systems.   As an example, the 
utilization of SysML for auto-embedded systems are discussed in [49] [50].  The 
application of SysML for railroad crossings was identified in [51].  
 
Contributions of this study.  This study showed the benefits and provided a unique 
approach to extend software modeling techniques into the digital forensic domain.  
The actual subjects of the model were the computational mechanisms of the software 
architecture of evidence creation.  The computational mechanisms as defined by this 
work were the forensically relevant data structures and control flow as dictated by the 
relevant device component(s).  In other works for digital forensics, UML was used to 
model evidence acquisition, analysis of evidence, and attack methodologies.  Other 
modeling techniques were utilized to reason on the validity of evidence.  These works 
did not address the system level constructs of the computational mechanisms.  None of 
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the UML modeling techniques investigated for this study addressed executable models 
nor utilizing the outputs of executable models to be utilized by other applications.  
 Other works did address utilizing UML to produce animations.  However, 
these animations were not related to digital forensics.  This work utilized the 
formalism which UML provides to generate formal artifacts which could be parsed 
and animated for a forensic application.  This animation provided insight on forensic 
applications based on models that can enhance domain understanding. 
 This work utilized the principle of abstraction along with discovered 
commonality patterns to define top-level models from detailed implementations.  A 
resulting repeatable modeling process on how to construct the abstracted top-level was 
identified.  An equivalent process was not seen in the literature review. 
Patterns are common in object oriented software development.  Higher level 
patterns have been developed for security design patterns and attack patterns for cyber 
security.  Although patterns have been addressed for cyber security, they were not 
addressed in any of the literature reviewed on digital forensics.  The patterns 
developed for this work are unique in that they define what is common in the data 
structures and control flow of the computational mechanisms which are relevant to 
evidence creation. 
The other works reviewed during this study identified various types of 
software-based metrics.  This work extended the metrics of other works to introduce a 
new metric for addressing commonality across implementations.  In addition a second 
new metric was developed to quantify the level of abstraction between top-level 
models and models of specific implementations.  
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Profiles are a common mechanism to extend UML in other domains, as seen 
with SysML.  However, the literature search did not identify any digital forensic 
related profiles.  This work also identifies a process to construct profiles from top-
level views. 
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CHAPTER 3 
3 METHODOLOGY 
 
This work has two primary focus areas, the construction of top-level models 
and profiles, and the development of a learning application utilizing models artifacts.  
The first focus area results in the construction of the top-level models to address 
digital forensic complexities through abstraction.  The top-level models facilitate the 
construction of profiles which make modeling more accessible to digital forensic 
stakeholders.  The second focus area addressed complexities by demonstrating that 
modeling could facilitate the development of applications utilized to enhance the 
understanding of digital forensic stakeholders. 
A combination of expert review, analysis, test, and metrics were used to show that 
the objectives were met, see Table 3-1. 
 
Table 3-1.  Validating the Objectives 
Objective Success Criteria Validation  Method 
1: Facilitate Learning and 
Analysis Application 
Model based application has utility for 
a user role. 
Expert Review. 
1: Facilitate Learning and 
Analysis Application 
Application provides model 
abstractions for multiple user roles. 
Expert Review. 
2: Reduced Complexity Common Implementation Patterns 
Discovered. 
Analysis (bottom-up) of 
specific models. 
2: Reduce Complexity Top-level models developed for a set 
of implementations. 
Analysis utilizing construction. 
2: Reduced Complexity Top-level model equivalent to specific 
implementation models.  
Test utilizing transformation. 
2: Reduced Complexity Increased commonality and increased 
abstraction shown in metrics. 
Metrics. 
3: Extensibility Repeatable procedure to extend 
models for implementation and 
implementation types.   
Analysis utilizing construction. 
 
3: Extensibility Repeatable procedure developed to 
extend profiles. 
Analysis utilizing construction. 
4: DF UML Profile A Profile constructed from models.  Analysis utilizing construction  
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Constructive methods “are heuristics that build up a complete solution from 
scratch by sequentially adding components to a partial solution until the solution 
is complete” [52].  For this work, a constructive method was utilized to define the 
top-level models and profiles.  In addition, the constructive method provided the 
steps to perform the constructive analysis and test, as identified in Table 3-1.  The 
constructive method itself was shown to be repeatable and was one of the 
outcomes of this work.  The constructive method provided a procedure to extend 
models and profiles. 
Two metrics were used in this work to determine the level of abstraction and to 
assess commonality for various steps in the constructive method.  The Top-Level 
Abstract Metric (TLAM) characterized the reduction of model elements of the 
abstracted top-level model with the elements in the implementation specific models.  
The Implementation Commonality Metric (ICM) was developed to measure 
commonality.  The more commonality that existed resulted in fewer types of 
components that needed to be taken into account, thus reducing complexity.   
Lastly, an application was developed to animate the behavioral script for a 
specific model.  The animated application demonstrated that a model could be used 
directly to generate an application, which could assist the human stakeholder in 
understanding digital forensic complexities.  This was an example of how models 
could facilitate the development of tools/applications to increase human 
understandability.  The University of Rhode Island (URI) Digital Forensics and Cyber 
Security Center (DFCSC) [53] staff evaluated the application. 
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This chapter begins by addressing the digital forensic problem space and how it 
relates to this work.   Next, the constructive methodology is discussed, the forensic 
subjects to be modeled are identified, followed by the modeling implementation 
approach.  The metrics to address commonality and complexity are then introduced.  
Lastly, the animated application is described. 
 
3.1 Mapping to the digital forensic problem space 
The digital forensic problem space that this work addressed is combinatorically 
explosive.  There is an uncountable number of digital forensic scenarios that can be 
executed on practically an uncountable number of implementations of devices and 
device components. 
Figure 3-1 displays how this work addressed the problem space.  Forensic areas in 
the context of this work include media analysis, media management analysis, file 
system analysis, application analysis, network analysis, operating system analysis, 
executable analysis, image analysis, and video analysis, as originally identified by 
[54].  Additional areas that were added over time include RAM (Random Access 
Memory), mobile, and database forensics. 
 Given a forensic area, there are forensic use-cases which identify specific 
investigation types.  A use-case, in the context of this work, was a set of actions 
performed by the suspect on the targeted system or device that would be of interest to 
the forensic stakeholder.  A use-case scenario was one realization of a use-case which 
requires an initial configuration.  A forensic attribute was either the evidence or 
contributes to evidence identification for the forensic stakeholder.   
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This work utilized use-case descriptions to describe a high-level scenario and 
the forensic attributes that were of interest for a particular type of forensic evidence 
creation.  The descriptions were accompanied by an associated use-case diagram that 
provided additional details of the activities, the system boundary, and participants 
(e.g., actors) in the scenario.  The combination of the use-case description and use-
case diagram provided the specification for that which was modeled. 
The forensic scenario and forensic attributes of what, when, where of the 
evidence assist in determining the data structures of the specific implementation.  It 
should be noted that the forensic attributes may be at a much higher level of 
abstraction than the actual implementation of the underlying device or component.  
The how of evidence creation is reflected in how the underlying computational data 
structures are utilized and how they change during a scenario. 
 
 
Figure 3-1.  Problem Space. 
 
 This work focused on developing models for the application, file system, and 
RAM analysis areas.  The application analysis area was chosen because there is an 
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ever-increasing number of application types and implementations.  The file system 
area was chosen because the file system is utilized by many applications and there 
exist a large number of file system implementations.  The RAM area was chosen 
because it contains key evidence not available through other types of analysis since it 
provides insight into the state of the operating system.  RAM analysis performs 
forensic analysis on what resides in RAM at the time it was captured.  The models 
created in this project were based on materials utilized in the URI digital forensic 
courses and published articles.  The specific analysis areas, implementations, and use-
cases used for this work are shown in Table 3-2. 
 
Table 3-2.  Implementations 
 
3.2 Eight-Step constructive method 
The eight steps which comprised the constructive methodology are detailed in  
Figure 3-2.  In the diagram, the set of steps are shown along with the focus of the step.  
In addition, the steps in which metrics were taken are identified.  Also shown are the 
mapping of the steps to the objectives.  The constructive method first specifies what is 
to be modeled.  There are three use-case scenarios modeled in this work, each 
consisting of three implementations.  This resulted in the eight-step methodology 
being completed three times. 
Analysis Areas Implemen- 
tation  1 
Implemen-
tation 2 
Implemen-
tation 3 
Evidence Creation 
Use-case  
Application 
(Browser)  
Edge Safari Chrome Browsing history, 
downloads, cookie 
artifacts 
Memory/RAM Windows Linux Mac (e.g, 
macOS,iOS) 
Backdoors and remote 
user access 
File Systems FAT NTFS EXT File allocation/deletion 
  
24 
 
Figure 3-3 identifies the significant products of the constructive methodology.  The 
use-case description and use-case diagram specify what is to be modeled.   Figure 3-4 
provides a graphical representation of the types of modeling artifacts utilized for the 
first seven steps of the constructive method.   
The specification was used to develop the implementation specific models.  
Once developed, the implementation specific models were analyzed for commonalities 
from both a black box and white box perspective.  From a black box perspective, 
common functionality across the implementations was identified as a functional group.   
The functional groups were utilized to extend the initial use-case.  The resultant 
extended use-case described the top-level model.  From a white box perspective, the 
forensic data structures and scenario control flow were analyzed to determine common 
implementation patterns. 
 The top-level model implements the functional groups and the associated use-
case scenario.  An analysis was performed to determine which implementation pattern 
should be utilized to implement the functional group.  The top-level and 
implementation models were shown to be equivalent by ensuring that the attributes of 
the modeled data structures could be transformed to the forensic attributes.  
From the function top-level models, the use-case profile can be defined.  The 
three use-case profiles constructed from this work were integrated to develop the 
holistic digital forensic profile. 
 
  
 
2
5
 
 
Figure 3-2.  Constructive Method. 
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Figure 3-3.  Constructive Method Concepts 
 
  
 
2
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Figure 3-4 Detailed Steps 1 thru 7 
 
  
28 
 
 
Model specification (step 1).  The first step was to determine the use-cases and use-
case descriptions.  The use-cases identified the actors, the systems (i.e., devices), the 
activities or functions, and components utilized by a suspect for a given scenario.  The 
high-level functions were typically at the operating system or at the application level 
(e.g., Microsoft Word, Chrome browser, command line, etc.).  After the use-case and 
the associated scenario were determined, the associated forensic attributes were 
identified.   The use-case description defined a specific usage of the use-case.  The 
forensic attributes set the model abstraction level.    
 
Develop specific models (step 2).  There were three specific model implementations 
developed for the use-case.  The relevant components (e.g., operating system, 
applications) and forensic data structures of the implementation were the focus of the 
static model.  The operating system and applications were the typical components in 
the model along with the forensic data structures.  The forensic data structures were 
often modeled from tables in forensic documentation or documentation which 
described the functionality of interest.  The use-case scenario was the basis for the 
behavioral model that was developed as a state diagram and utilized action language.  
In addition, the initial conditions for each implementation scenario where defined.  
 
Execute models (step 3).  The specific models were instrumented so that upon model 
execution, an XML script was created.  The XML script logged the behavior of the 
model during the implementation with respect to the forensic attributes.  In the 
  
29 
 
specific models, these captured attributes may not have been the exact forensic 
attributes, but they could be related to the forensic attributes.   For each 
implementation, the model behavioral script was verified against the source 
documentation to ensure the model implementation exhibited the expected behavior.   
 
Model analysis (step 4).  The implementation of specific models were analyzed to 
identify common implementation patterns and functional groups.  The static 
implementation patterns focused on the underlying forensic data structures of the 
implementations.  The dynamic patterns focused on the control flow of the scenario.  
The implementation patterns provide a white box definition of the underlying 
computational mechanisms. 
The functional groups were the grouping of the common functionality across 
the implementations in support of the activities defined in the use-cases.  The 
functional groups provided a black box definition of the underlying computational 
mechanisms. The initial use-case diagrams were extended to incorporate the additional 
functionality identified by the functional groupings.   Metrics were collected to 
identify the common patterns as opposed to the unique model elements in each 
implementation. 
 
Develop top-level model (step 5).  The top-level model was composed of the 
components and the functionality as defined by the functional groupings.  Analysis 
was needed to determine which common implementation patterns were to be utilized 
to model the functional groups in the top-level model.  In addition, a determination 
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needed to be made about which component provided the control thread.  This 
component would contain the dynamic behavior that was defined by the state diagram.  
Associated Object Action Language (OAL)  was created to achieve the desired 
behavior of the generation of the forensic attributes for the use-case scenario.  Metrics 
were taken to quantify commonality across the use-case and to quantify model 
abstraction. 
 
Validate top-level model (step 6).  Model equivalence showed that the behavior of the 
top-level model was equivalent to the behavior of all the specific models for a given 
scenario.  Figure 3-5 shows conceptually how model equivalence was determined.  
The executable models were instrumented such that an XML script was generated, 
capturing the behavior of the top-level model and the behavior for each 
implementation-specific model with respect to the forensic attributes of the given 
scenario.   
To verify that the specific implementation models were equivalent to the top-
level model, eXtensible Stylesheet Language (XSLT) transformation rules for each 
specific model were developed to map the specific model attributes to the forensic 
attributes of the top-level model.  It was also verified that the top-level model 
behavioral script addressed the forensic attributes utilizing XSLT.   
This mapping was analyzed to assess equivalence.  If the top-level and specific 
models executed the same use-case scenario and each model either directly accounted 
for the forensic attributes or could map to the forensic attributes through a 
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transformation, it was reasonable to claim that the specific models were equivalent to 
the top-level model. 
 
 
Figure 3-5.  Model Equivalence Example 
 
 An example of an XSLT transformation is shown in Figure 3-6.  The XSTL 
rule is used to transform the specific models attribute of clusterSize to the top-level 
model’s attribute of dataUnitSize.  Also, this attribute was calculated by the equation 
bytesPerSector * sectorsPerDataUnit. 
 
 
Figure 3-6.  Example of a FAT XSLT Transformation Rule for sectorsPerDataUnit 
 
 
 As shown in Table 3-3, four transformation rules were identified: direct 
mapping, equivalent mapping, intermediate step, and calculation.  A direct mapping 
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transformation occurred when there was no difference between the attributes of the 
top-level and specific model, of which bytesPerSector attribute is an example.  An 
equivalent mapping transformation occurred when both specific and top-level models 
used the concept without a direct one-to-one mapping, such as time.  For example, 
time was used in each specific model for the file system category, however, it was 
applied differently across the implementation of specific models.  An intermediate 
step transformation occurred when there were multiple steps to determine an attribute 
that was common across the category but was determined differently in each model.   
For example, in the file system category, there was a need to determine the target 
directory location, but this was done differently for each implementation.   A 
calculation transformation occurred when the attribute was used in a calculation to 
determine a forensic attribute value. 
 
Table 3-3.  Types of Transformation Rules 
Transformation 
Type 
Description Example 
 
Direct Mapping Attribute of specific model (SM) 
is the forensic attribute of the top-
level model (TLM). 
bytesPerSector 
Equivalent Mapping SM attribute is equivalent to 
TLM forensic attribute. 
time 
Intermediate step SM attribute is utilized in an 
intermediate step to obtain the 
TLM forensic attribute. 
To determine file 
location need target 
directory 
Calculation SM attribute is utilized in a 
calculations to obtain the TLM 
forensic attribute. 
dataUnitSize = 
bytesPerSector*Sector
sPerDU 
 
Develop use-case profile (step 7).  Use-case profiles for each use-case were developed 
from the top-level model of the use-case.  The functional grouping implementations 
were captured as stereotypes in the profile diagrams.  The top-level model data types 
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were used to assist in developing the stereotype tags.  However, not all top-level data 
types were utilized, specifically if they were too detailed or implementation specific.   
 
Develop/integrate DF profile (step 8).  The use-case profiles were analyzed to create 
one digital forensic profile.  Common stereotypes across all the area profiles were then 
refactored to ensure that one representation worked across all areas.  The area profiles 
were adjusted so as to not duplicate the stereotypes which resided in the common 
stereotypes.   The common stereotypes and the adjusted unique profiles were 
combined to create the overall digital forensic profile.  Metrics were taken to quantify 
commonality across the use-cases. 
 
Constructive Method Contribution.  A contribution of this work was the modeling of 
the relevant computational mechanisms for evidence creation.  How this modeling was 
performed is identified by the constructive method.  The constructive method itself has 
resulted in artifacts and processes which are also contributions of this work.  The 
artifacts and processes are: 
1. Identified a process to construct top-level implementation views of 
computational mechanisms, 
2. Identified modeling patterns to catalog commonalties in computational 
mechanisms, and 
3. Introduced a digital forensic profile along with a process to extend the profile. 
3.3 Model specification: use-cases and use-case descriptions-(step 1) 
Three model specifications were defined for the file system create/delete use-
case, the browser, browse and download use-case and the RAM list process/network 
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connection use-case.  For each of these use-cases, a use-case description and use-case 
diagram are defined.  
3.3.1 File system forensics 
The file system implementations were based on [55] and were augmented with 
materials from URI forensic coursework.  Figure 3-7 depicts the file system 
create/delete use-case and Figure 3-8 provides the use-case description that included 
the high-level scenario and the associated forensic attributes.    
The file system allocation/delete use-case scenario begins when the suspect 
“saves” a new file.   At some later point in time, the user deletes the file by moving it 
to “trash”.  The file system use-case was investigating evidence that was created 
during file allocation and file deletion.  Evidence of interest included information on 
the file itself, times, and information, all of which could be used to find evidence, and 
file slack, which could be areas in which data can be hidden.   
When modeling a use-case, only the functions that are available for all of the 
implementations should be included in the use-case scenario to ensure the consistency 
of the results in the top-level model.  For example, since the journaling capability is 
not available in FAT file system, it is not addressed in the file allocation/deletion use-
case scenario.   
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Figure 3-7.  File System Use-Case Diagram 
 
 
 
Figure 3-8  File System Use-Case Description 
 
3.3.1.1 File Allocation Table (FAT) file system   
The major data structures of the FAT file systems include the boot sector, the 
FAT, the directory structure, and the clusters.  The boot sector contains the information 
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required for the operating system to determine locations of the relevant data structures.  
File contents are stored as clusters.  The directory is represented as a set of tables 
whose entries contain information on a specific file or a subordinate directory.  The 
FAT table provides information about the clusters in which the file information is 
stored. 
An example of a file allocation and deallocation in the FAT file system are 
shown in Figure 3-9.  In this scenario, the file “ root\dir\file1.dat” which is 6000 bytes 
is to be allocated to a FAT file system which has a cluster size of 4096 bytes.  The FAT 
scenario begins when the OS reads values from the Boot Sector to determine cluster 
size and the location of key file structures.  The OS then reads the root directory to 
determine the cluster number of the next directory in the path.  Once the target 
directory is found the metadata for the file entry in the target directory is inserted.  
This includes long file name (LFN) and short file name (SFN), size, timestamps, and 
the setting of associated flags. The OS then determines the cluster to be used as the 
start cluster for the file.  This cluster is written, and if there is more to write, the next 
free cluster is determined from the FAT.  This process is repeated until there is no 
additional file information to write.  At this point, the write time is updated.   
 For file deletion the OS determines the location of the target directory, using 
the same process as described above for file allocation.  Utilizing the target directory 
entry, the target file is located, and the start cluster of the target file is identified.  
Utilizing the FAT, the entries in the FAT are marked as “empty”, but the contents 
remain.  In addition, the file names in the target directory entry are modified, but not 
deleted.  Times stamps and relevant flags are updated as required. 
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Figure 3-9.  FAT File Allocation/Deletion.  Adapted from [55] 
  
 
3.3.1.2 New Technology File System (NTFS)   
The NTFS major data structures are the Master File Table (MFT) and Clusters.  
The MFT entries are composed of attributes, which are themselves complex data 
structures.  There are MFT entries for directories and files and other data structures 
which are of importance to the file system. 
An example of a file allocation and deallocation in the NTFS file system is 
shown in Figure 3-10.  In this scenario the file “ root\dir\file1.dat,” which is 4000 
bytes, was to be allocated to an NTFS file system that had a cluster size of 2048 bytes.  
The file allocation began when the OS accessed the boot sector to determine cluster 
size and the requisite information to process the MFT.  In the data attribute within the 
associated MFT entry, the allocation of clusters were defined in terms of data runs.   A 
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data run is a method in defining how an ordered set of clusters can be logically 
encoded in bits. 
The MFT Entry Bitmap was processed to determine an empty MFT entry.  
This entry had the relavant attributes created or updated.  The Cluster Bitmap was 
used to determine the set of clusters to which the file contents were to be written.  The 
relevant attributes were updated and then the file content was written.  
Next, the target directory in which the file resided was updated.  Starting from 
the root directory MFT entry, the entry for the target directory entry was determined 
by navigating the directory structure.  The relevant attributes for the target directory 
entry were updated. 
File deletion is accomplished by starting with the MFT Entry for the root, 
processing the relevant attributes to determine the MFT Entry for the target directory.  
From this, the MFT entry for the target file is determined.  The target directory is 
adjusted to account for the deletion of the file.  MFT entry in the Bit Map is processed 
to indicate that the clusters are available.    
After file deletion, the file contents are still in the clusters and the pointers to 
the underlying attributes still exist. 
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Figure 3-10.  NTFS File Allocation/Deletion.  Adapted from [55]. 
 
3.3.1.3 Extended (EXT) file system   
The implementation details for allocation and deallocation of files in the EXT 
file system are shown in Figure 3-11.  The major data structure of the EXT files 
system are the Super Block, Block Group Descriptor table, Inode tables, Block 
Bitmaps, Inode Bitmaps, and Directory contents. 
In this scenario, the file “ root\dir\file1.dat,” which was 6000 bytes was to be 
allocated to a EXT file system that had a block size of 1024 bytes.  The scenario began 
when the operating system accessed the superblock to obtain the block size and 
structural information.  Based on this, the OS was able to process the block that 
contained the Root Directory Inode Table and to process the directory path to the 
target Block Group and the associated Inode Table.  From the Inode table, the block 
which contained the target directory contents is determined.  The unused space in the 
directory for the targeted file was also determined.  The Inode for the new entry is 
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identified from the Block Groups Inode Bitmap.  Utilizing this information, the file 
information is entered in the directory structure and the values of the file Inode were 
initialized.  Utilizing the Block Bitmap, the file contents were written to the blocks. 
To perform file deletion, the OS system starts from the root directory and 
process the EXT structures in the same way as described above for file allocation to 
determine the location of the targeted directory structure.  The targeted file elements 
are removed from the block containing the directory contents and the file Inode was 
deallocated.  In addition, the associated entries for the Block Bitmap are deallocated. 
At the end of the deallocation process the contents in the blocks still exist. 
 
 
Figure 3-11.  EXT File Allocation/Deletion.  Adapted from [55]. 
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3.3.2 Browser forensics 
Numerous sources [56] [57] [58] [59] [60] were utilized for the browser model.  
To gain further insight on how to model the browser user-case additional research was 
accomplished utilizing the open source database browser for SQLite [61] to analyze 
how Chrome stores web information.  Browser forensics utilizes numerous artifacts, 
including: 
 History: list of visited URLs. 
 Cookies: the cookies and associated information from sites visited.  
 Downloaded files: the metadata for the files that have been downloaded 
by the browser. 
Figure 3-12 depicts the Browser use-case and Figure 3-13 provides a description of the 
use-case, which includes the scenario and the associated forensic attributes.  This use-
case depicts the scenario in which the suspect is either browsing sites (some with 
cookies enabled) or downloading artifacts.  In this scenario, the user (i.e., the suspect) 
browsed numerous websites, some of which used cookies, and cookies were enabled 
on the suspect’s computer.  The user also downloaded some documents.    
 Types of evidence include the URL, title of the webpage, time visited, and the 
number of times visited.  Since some of the sites use cookies, the cookie names and 
cookie values are also available.  In addition, the time of cookie creation and access 
times are available, as is the cookie expiration times.   
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Figure 3-12.  Browser Use-Case Diagram 
 
 
Figure 3-13.  Browser Use-Case Description 
 
 
The underlying information for the browser application was either stored in databases 
or files in the file systems.  Table 3-4.  Browser Configurations provides the names of 
the files and databases that were of interest for the browsers and attributes for this 
work. 
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Table 3-4.  Browser Configurations.  Adapted from [56] [57] [60]. 
    Path Database Table 
Chrome Download 
\users\user\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\UserData
/Default\databases History downloads 
  history 
/users/user/AppData/Local/Google/Chrome/UserData
/Default History url 
  cookies 
/users/user/AppData/Local/Google/Chrome/UserData
/Default Cookies cookies 
          
Edge Cookies 
/users/user/AppData/Local/WebCache/WebCacheV0
1.dat WebCacheV01.dat CookieEntryEx 
  downloads 
/users/user/AppData/Local/WebCache/WebCacheV0
1.dat WebCacheV01.dat Containers 
  History 
/users/user/AppData/Local/WebCache/WebCacheV0
1.dat WebCacheV01.dat Containers 
          
Safari Cookies /Users/&USER/Library/Cookies/cookies.plist NSDictionaryCookies NSDictionaryCookies 
  downloads /Users/&USER/Library/Safari/DownLoad.plist DownLoad.plist NSDictionaryDL 
  History /Users/&USER/Library/Safari/History.plist History.plist NSDictionairesHistory 
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3.3.3 Random Access Memory (RAM) forensics 
 Ligh, Case, and Walters [62] described Volatility tool suite, a well-known 
open-source tool suite for memory forensics.  Volatility supports analysis on the 
Microsoft Windows, Mac OS X, and Linux operating systems.  In addition to the 
Volatility sources [62], standard OS textbooks and educational sources [63] [64] [65] 
[66] were utilized for the implementation description. 
RAM forensics is the analysis of volatile memory in computer systems.  
Memory forensics requires a memory image to be captured that provides the state of 
RAM at a given point in time.  In the case of Volatility, an image is loaded into the 
framework that includes commands to retrieve the desired information.  This image is 
run with a library implemented in Python.   
RAM includes the current state of the operating system, executing 
applications, and network connections.  RAM also provides the internal details of data 
structures.  Examples of information memory forensics can identify include [67]:  
 Past and current network connections; 
 List of running processes at the time of RAM capture; 
 User names and passwords; 
 Loaded Dynamically Linked Libraries (DLL); 
 Open registry keys for a process; 
 Open files for a process; 
 Unpacked/decrypted versions of a program; and 
 Memory resident malware. 
 
  
45 
 
Understanding RAM forensics requires an understanding of the operating 
system data structures and algorithms.  From a high level of abstraction, the operating 
system implementation is described in numerous textbooks which were previously 
cited.  Typical operating system textbooks segment the operating system into five 
categories: Process Management, Memory Management, Virtual Memory, Storage 
Management, and I/O.    However, specific information on any implementation, such 
as Windows and iOS, are scarce, and the differences between implementation versions 
are even less available.  To that end, forensic information has only been identified by 
researchers who have been able to reverse engineer the operating systems.  Open 
source operating systems, such as Linux, present a different type of issue.  With open 
source the source code is likely available, however there is significant work required 
to understand the source.  The important aspects of the operating system need to be 
abstracted so the forensic analyst knows what to look for. 
Figure 3-14 depicts the RAM use-case diagram and Figure 3-15 provides the 
associated use-case description that identifies the high-level scenario and the forensic 
attributes.  This use-case was used to track process and network connections 
associated with applications.  In this use-case there were multiple processes running in 
the computer and open network connections.  The user (i.e., suspect) hacked into a 
target machine.  The inspector was trying to determine if malware was installed and/or 
if information was being compromised or exfiltrated.  Types of information of interest 
were the name, process identification, process parents, and times when the processes 
were started. 
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Figure 3-14.  RAM Use-case Diagram 
 
 
Figure 3-15.  RAM Use-case Description 
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For this use-case, the focus was on running processes and network 
connections.  Utilizing RAM forensics enabled the stakeholder to understand the 
processes that were being executed on the device.  Knowing the processes that were 
running provided a forensic analyst information about what applications, and 
potentially what activities, were being performed.  A forensic analyst could potentially 
determine if there were any harmful processes running since the malware processes 
were likely to be hidden or disguised.    
Knowing about any open connections provided evidence of whether the device 
was communicating to the outside or if an outside source had hacked into the device.  
IP addresses provided information on the location of the outside source.  Knowing 
about any open ports provided information on potential vulnerabilities. 
Figure 3-16 is a compilation of a generalized high-level operating system 
architecture derived from numerous sources [63] [64] [65] [66].  The operating system 
architecture in the figure is a very high level abstraction which was used for the 
development of the RAM model.  Figure 3-15 depicts the relevant operating system 
components for the executing application process (e.g., Process).  Processes have 
virtual memory space in which their stacks and heap reside.  Application executables 
are loaded into the process memory space. The application has a network connection.  
The operating system has a Process Management and I/O Management subsystems.  
The Process Management subsystem provides the algorithms that service application 
processes.  The application has a Handle Table that provides the reference to the 
network communication stack (e.g., CommsObj)   between the application and the 
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Network Interface Card (NIC).  The application communicates over the network 
utilizing the Socket API. 
The Process List has a reference to all the processes.  The Network Connection 
List has a reference to all the connections, with each connect having a CommsObj.  
There are two types of command line tools.  The Process Command Line Tool 
provides the list of processes and relevant forensic information for the processes.  The 
Network Command Line Tool provides a list of connection and the relevant forensic 
information associated with the connection. 
 
 
Figure 3-16.  RAM Architectural View  
 
Processes are described by a structure that contains relevant details and 
references to other key operating system structures/resources.  The process list, which 
contains the process structures, can be implemented as a linked list.  For example, an 
implementation for a Windows 7 system is shown in Figure 3-17.  However, based on 
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general textbook descriptions it is reasonable to conclude that a link list of processes 
could also be utilized to represent Linux and OS.  
 
Figure 3-17.  Process List.  Adapted from [62]. 
 
By analyzing the process list, the forensic analyst is able to determine the 
applications that are running and potentially the start times for the applications both of 
which could be tied to user activity.  In addition, the forensic analyst may want to 
inspect for malware.  This can be accomplished by: 
 inspecting for unexpected processes, or 
 inspecting the parent and child to determine anomalies in how the child 
was launched. 
 The application utilizes the sockets API to interface with the Communication 
Object, which represents the network communications of the system.  A socket 
provides an “endpoint” for sending and/or receiving data.  A socket can be accessed 
by a process to either receive or send data.  The process knows how to address the 
socket by accessing the file descriptor in the handle table, which is the implementation 
of the OSI-7 layer stack.  The network stack contains the network information, such as 
IP addresses and ports for the application.  
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3.4 Model implementation (steps 2 & 3) 
3.4.1 Modeling overview   
The UML is a modeling language based on an Object Oriented (OO) 
programming approach for software development.  UML modeling is equivalent to 
programming in most procedural languages, but modeling is at a higher abstraction 
level.  UML models are often used to provide the overarching software design for 
software systems.  This design is then utilized to implement the software system in the 
more expressive procedural languages.  In addition, models, like traditional source 
code, can be executed utilizing a model compiler. 
UML was derived from previous methodologies in the 1990s under the OMG 
standards organization.  UML is a visual language based on diagrams.  The objective 
of UML was to address complexities in software design and architecture.  UML 
provides a formalism to model structure and behavior to allow for the generation of 
various consistent views from a single model representation.  Over time, UML has 
been extended to address vocabulary and concepts in other domains through profiles.   
UML is in a family of modeling standards.  Standards are significant in that 
they provide the requirements for how the technologies are to be implemented and 
ensure that the implementations are consistent.  These standards provide a means for 
tool and environment vendors to develop products to perform modeling.  Standards 
also ensure that the modeling constructs are the same across environments, which 
allows a consistent utilization of models. The standards are also implemented by tool 
vendors or organizations developing open source tools.  For example, this work was 
implemented utilizing publically available implementations of tool environments.   
The two primary environments to support the modeling for this work were eXecutable 
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Translatable UML [21] and Papyrus [68].  The model execution utilized xtUML and 
the profile development utilized Papyrus. 
Papyrus is an open source plug-in to the Eclipse Integrated Development 
Environment (IDE).  Papyrus fully supports the UML specification and as a result 
allows for the modeling of profiles. 
The open source environment utilized to develop the executable models was 
xtUML, developed by BridgePoint.  This modeling environment supports a limited 
subset of UML and is a plug-in to the Eclipse IDE.  The xtUML environment utilizes 
class diagrams, component diagrams, state diagrams, and an action language and 
features a model compiler allowing for model execution.  In addition, the environment 
allows the ability to bridge with applications which are outside of the xtUML 
environment, which allows for model instrumentation in which the model behavior 
can be captured. 
 
3.4.2 UML diagrams 
UML models are created (i.e., programmed) as the UML diagrams are 
developed.  In programming languages, grammars are used to define the language, 
whereas in modeling languages, it is the underlying metamodel which defines the 
modeling language.  The modeling environment enforces the metamodel rules which 
are required to ensure diagram correctness and consistency.   
UML consists of fifteen diagrams, seven structural and eight behavior 
(depicted in Figure 3-18).   Structural diagrams such as the class diagram represent the 
entities being modeled and the relationship between the entities in terms of 
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associations.  Another structured diagram is the object diagram, which shows specific 
instances of the classes.  Instances are related by links.   
An example of a behavioral diagram is the state machine diagram, which 
shows the internal behavior of the class.  The use-case diagram, another behavioral 
diagram, identifies system functions which are contained in the system boundary 
along with the actors or stakeholders who utilize the system based on the use-case 
functions.  
To be valid, a diagram needs to adhere to the UML-specified rules.  These 
rules ensure that the model representation is consistent across the diagrams.        
 
 
Figure 3-18.  UML Diagrams.  Adapted from Visual Paradigm (2019) Retrieved from 
https://www.visual-paradigm.com/guide/uml-unified-modeling-language/what-is-uml/ 
 
This effort was specifically focused on the class diagrams, state machine 
diagrams, use-case diagrams, and, to a lesser extent, object diagrams.  In this work, 
object diagrams were not developed but their equivalence was realized and viewable 
in the modeling environment when the models were executed. 
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Class diagram: structural formalism.  A class diagram consists of classes and 
relationships between classes.   A class is a template used to describe objects that 
consist of properties or attributes and behaviors defined by methods or operations.  
Classes, when instantiated in a program, become objects.   
 Relationship between classes are shown as associations, which are represented 
as lines between classes.  Association end points may have role names and 
multiplicities.  If a role name is not specified, the role name is defaulted to the class 
name, in lower case, at the end of the association.  The arrow on the association lines 
represents how the class diagram is navigated.  Navigation shows the sequencing of 
how class attributes are to be accessed.  Multiplicities are also shown on either end of 
an association.  Multiplicities indicate the number of instances that result when the 
class is instantiated.  Multiplicity values are often represented as 0, 1, and ‘*’.   A 
multiplicity of 0 to any number of elements is denoted by ‘*’ and a multiplicity of 1 to 
any number of elements is denoted by 1  ‘*'.   Cases in which instantiation results in 
multiple objects of the target class result in a collection of objects.  
 A collection may be a set (e.g., a mathematical set with no duplicate 
elements), a bag (e.g., a set which may have duplicate elements), an ordered set (e.g., 
elements ordered by position), or a sequence (e.g., a bag in which elements are 
ordered).   
Important association types include: 
 Inheritance (represented as an arrow): provides a subtyping (“is-a” 
relationship); 
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 Composition (represented as a filled in diamond): an association type 
between class elements which have a “has-a” or “part-of” relationship;  
 Aggregation (represented as a diamond): an association type between class 
elements which have a “has-a” or “part-of” relationship.  This differs from 
composition in that the “parts” can exist even if the whole does not;  
 Dependency Association (represented as a dashed line on an association to 
a dependency class): a class which provides attributes on an association. 
Figure 3-19 provides an example of a class diagram notation.  Class diagrams may 
also contain data types, as can be seen in the diagram.  Data types are similar to 
classes but do not have operations.  In this example, class A and class B have attributes 
and operations; attributes have types and multiplicities.  Attributes which have 
multiplicities greater than one can be viewed as a collection.  Attributes which are of a 
type of a specific class or data type have a dependency on that class or data type.  As 
an example, the class B attribute attC  can have an array of zero or more of  KeyValue 
data types.  Class B inherits from class A resulting in class B having attributes of attS 
and attC.  There is a composition between with class B and class C.  There is a 
dependency class, class F, on the association, between class B has and class D.  Class E 
has a shared aggregation with class G.  In addition, both role names and multiplicities 
are shown on the associations. 
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Figure 3-19. Example Class Diagram Notation 
 
 
Another example of a class diagram in Papyrus is shown in Figure 3-20.  The 
DataElementCollection class has a size attribute.  In addition the DataElementCollection  
class is composed (associated) with  the DataElement class with a 1-to-many 
relationship.  The DataElement class has an id attribute of type Integer and a keyValue 
attribute of type KeyValue, which is a data type.  The attribute KeyValue data type has a 
tuple of key of type Integer and a value attribute of type Inteter. 
The diagram describes a collection class of unordered DataElement, with each 
DataElement containing a key-value pair.  The DataElementCollection class has the 
following functions: 
 addE: to add a key-value pair, 
 deleteE: to delete a key-value pair. 
The DataElement has the following functions: 
 read: to provide the value for a specific key, 
 write: to modify the value which is associated with an existing key. 
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Figure 3-20.  Example Collection Class 
 
Use-case diagrams.  A use-case diagram consists of a system of interest, 
actors, use-cases and, associations.  The system defines the boundaries of the entity 
being modeled; in the case of this work, the system is the forensic device of interest.  
Actors represent user roles or types of external systems.  The system to be modeled 
consists of use-cases. A use-case is a set of actions (e.g., activity) which performs a 
system function.   The actors interact with the system through associations.  Two 
association types specific to use-cases are include and extend.  The include 
relationship shows a dependency of one use-case on another use-case and the extend 
relationship specifies additional use-case which only occurs during certain scenarios. 
In the example shown in Figure 3-21, the actor is the suspect.  The system 
itself is a device type of Computer.  The actor chooses one of the use-cases, Browse 
Internet, Save file, or Start application.  All these use-cases depended on operating 
system use-cases and therefore the extend relationship is used.  The Operating System, 
the Word Application and the Browser use-cases are grouped as components in the 
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Computer.  The Browse Internet use-case is, extended by two use-cases, Enable cookies 
and Download file.  These use-cases occur when the user enables cookies, if required by 
the website or if the user downloads a file.  In addition, the user may browse to a 
website and decide to download a file.  These use-cases are contained in the Browser 
component.  Also depicted in a diagram is a Word Application which has a use-case to 
Start application or Save file. 
 
 
Figure 3-21.  Example Use-Case 
 
State machine: dynamic formalism.  A state machine is a behavioral model 
that consists of a set of states.  A state is some condition of the system at a particular 
time.   The current state can transition to another state given an event.  There are 
typically two special states, the initial state and the end state. 
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Figure 3-22 provides an example of a state machine depicting the state in 
which a computer could be from a user perspective.  Initially the user logs in.  Once 
logged into the system, the condition of the system will allow the user to start 
interacting with the system.  The user may choose to start a browser application to 
browse the Internet, or to start an application to work on a document, or they might 
choose to install an application.  The state machine provides transitions to go back to 
the LoggedIn state through which the user may choose another activity or simply log 
out.  The state machine defines the set of states that may be of interest to a digital 
forensic stakeholder.  Each of these states may have associated attributes that might 
contain evidence. 
 
Figure 3-22.  Example State Machine 
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3.4.3 Profile extensions for domain representation 
A profile is a mechanism to extend UML to add constructs that address domain 
vocabulary and concepts.  This is accomplished by extending the UML metamodel 
with stereotypes.  Stereotypes themselves may contain tags that are properties of the 
stereotypes.  OCL is utilized to further specify the relationships between the domain 
specific elements by defining constraints. 
The OMG modeling standards define various levels of modeling.  To 
understand how profiles relate, it is helpful to understand how they relate in the 
hierarchy.  The OMG model-driven engineering is a development methodology to 
create conceptual models in a domain.  The OMG Meta Object Facility (MOF) is a 
standard for model driven-engineering.  The MOF Metadata Architecture is shown in 
Table 3-5. This layered architecture consists of four levels.  The highest level, M3, is 
the most abstract and provides the metamodel for UML.  UML is at level M2 and 
provides the metamodel rules for the models which are developed in a UML 
environment.  This is the level of modeling performed in this work. The instantiation 
of these models resulted in the actual objects that related to some real world entity.   
When the model was executed, instantiations were created consistent with the 
scenario; this is at the M0 level. 
Table 3-5.  Meta Levels.  Adapted from [13] 
Meta-level MOF Terms Example 
M3 Meta-metamodel MOF Model 
M2 Metamodel UML Metamodel 
M1 Model UML Model 
M0 Object Modeled Systems 
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This work extended the UML metamodel by identifying a profile that 
addressed the digital forensic domain.  The models developed in this work were at the 
M1 level.  In a UML modeling the metamodel, instead of a grammar in traditional 
languages, is used to define model semantics.     
A domain specific profile was created by extending already predefined UML 
elements.  More specifically, a profile stereotype extends the meta-class element of the 
metamodel.  The meta-class could be any of the elements in a UML model (e.g., class, 
association, state machine, etc.).   
The elements in the metamodel are associated with each other by a class 
diagram.  A profile does not alter any of the elements of the metamodel (i.e., no 
associations are changed) but extends these associations with stereotypes.  The 
stereotypes themselves define new associations in the profile.  These associations may 
need additional constraints, which are added using OCL.  In addition, the stereotypes 
may contain meta-level properties that are identified with tags.   
OCL is a declarative language that can add constraints to UML diagrams, such 
as class and state diagrams.  OCL is utilized to further specify the meanings in the 
diagrams to which it is applied.  OCL can be viewed in terms of set theory.  OCL has a 
standard library of primitive types and provides operations for both primitive and user-
defined collection types.  An OCL expression has a context that is the element for 
which the OCL expression is defined.  To get to another element, the expression can 
have navigation rules to reach another element.   
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An example of a profile is displayed in Figure 3-23.  The stereotype names 
relate to terminology describing components (e.g. OS, File System) which are of 
interest to digital forensic stakeholders.  In this figure the OS stereotype extends from 
both the UML Class and UML StateMachine metamodel element.  The FileSystem 
stereotype extends the UML Class metamodel-element and OSCall stereotype extends 
the UML Association metamodel-element.  The OS stereotype has tags of name and 
version which are of type string and has an association with the FileSystem stereotype.  
The FileSystem stereotype has a clusterSize and name tags, both of type String.  There 
are two OCL constraints, both having a context of FileSystem.  The SizePositive 
constraint requires the cluster size to be greater than zero and the NameIsLetters 
constraint requires the name of the FileSystem to consist of letters only.  
 
Figure 3-23.  Files System Area Profile 
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3.4.4 Executable models 
Bridgepoint xtUML environment.   An executable model is a model that has 
run-time behavior.  This requires that the behavior of the model be sufficiently 
specified.  Executable models utilize behavior diagrams such as state or activity 
diagrams or an action language for control flow.   In order to adequately specify 
executable models, additional operational semantics were added to some UML 
diagrams using the fUML standard.  The textual representation assists in the 
development of executable models in cases in which a total graphical representation 
could be difficult.  The OMG has identified action languages semantics to UML 
standard.  The action language is model aware in that it can interact with model 
elements to enable the execution of the behavior diagrams.  The action language for 
xtUML is the Object Action Language (OAL).   
The modeling environment provided by xtUML is based on Shlaer-Mellor 
modeling methodology, which uses a subset of UML notation.  This modeling 
methodology only utilized a subset of UML diagrams and there are some minor 
differences within the constructs of these diagrams that needed to be addressed for this 
work.  As an example, xtUML state machines do not have specific initial and final 
state symbols. 
The key elements in the executable model for this work, the class diagrams, the 
state machines diagram, and the OAL action language, are depicted in Figure 3-24.  
The class diagram is utilized to model the forensic data structures and key components 
of interest.  The associations between classes are used for navigation by the OAL.  The 
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state machine diagram is utilized to model the behavior of the system for the scenario 
of interest.  The OAL provides the constructs to enable the control flow. 
 
 
 
Figure 3-24.  Model Element Types 
 
An example of a class diagram in xtUML is shown in Figure 3-25.  This is the 
same diagram shown in the papyrus example (Figure 3-20), with some important 
differences.  As an example, the xtUML class diagram does not distinguish between 
the different types of associations.  For this work, the differences between xtUML and 
Papyrus did not affect the outcome because they were mostly notational. 
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 In the example, the OS class has an attribute, osContext, which is a nested data 
type of OSData is the type of attribute osContext.  Figure 3-26 shows the structure of the 
nested data type as modeled. 
 
 
Figure 3-25.  xtUML Class Example 
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Figure 3-26.  Nested Data Types 
 
 
OAL is model aware, that is, it is able to interact with the model elements.  The 
action language provided control flow between classes and allowed access to the class 
attributes.  As an example of OAL, the operations in the class diagram snippet are 
shown in Figure 3-27.   
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Figure 3-27.  OAL Operation Implementation Examples 
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In Figure 3-25, the OS class has an associated state machine symbol.  The state 
machine (behavior) diagram consists of a set of states and the state transitions (see 
Figure 3-28).  Each state contains OAL to modify attributes, to make function calls, 
and to transition to other states.  In the case of the example, the init transition triggers 
the state machine.  In state X there is OAL code to invoke the functions associated with 
the DataElementCollection class after which there is a transition to state Y.  The state 
machine along with the OAL provide control flow for the model. 
 
 
Figure 3-28.  State Machine Example 
 
Model execution.  In this work control flow of the executable model was 
defined in the OS or application state machines for a particular scenario.  The OS and 
applications interacted with the various modeled forensic data structures during 
execution.   
The model needed to be initialized before it executed.  This initialization is 
analogous to the instantiation of classes in an object oriented languages or the 
equivalent of the object diagram in UML. 
In the context of this work, the model configuration was based on the use-case 
scenario being model.  The model contained a function that initialized the scenario by 
instantiating classes and defining links between the instances.  To configure the 
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scenario, an initialization function needed to be developed.  Figure 3-29 shows 
a configuration function for the example.  This function was manually invoked.     
After the configuration function was executed, the instantiated classes 
and relationships can be seen in the xtUML display environment, shown in 
Figure 3-30.  The DataElement instances and the shading of the Init state along 
with the instance values were of note. 
Next, after being initialized, the start function was invoked.  This 
function generated an event which triggered the state machine as illustrated 
with this OAL snippet: 
 
create event instance evt of OS_A1:init() to OS class; 
generate evt; 
 
 This trigger event caused the state machine to go through its states and 
to execute the OAL in the states to which it transitioned.  Figure 3-31 shows 
the state machine in its final state, Complete. 
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Figure 3-29.  Example xtUML Scenario Creation 
 
 
 
Figure 3-30.  Example Initial State 
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Figure 3-31.  Example xtUML Final State 
 
 
Capturing model behavior.  The models were instrumented to record 
model behavior.  Changes in modeled forensic data structures, state transitions, 
and changes in the focus of the thread of control are examples of captured 
behavior.   A Java application outside of the model recorded these changes in 
an XML file (see Figure 3-32).
  
 
7
1
 
 
 
Figure 3-32.  Capturing Behavior 
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More specifically, the xtUML environment provided a bridge or external entity object 
from which model operations could pass information to an external program.  Figure 
3-33 provides a snippet showing the definition of an external entity.  This external 
entity defines two operations, linkData and attributeDataI.  The operation linkData  
provided information on the entity with the control flow (e.g., the operating system) to 
the entity on which it was focused (e.g., forensic data structure).   Also provided in 
this operation was the “message” that might be passed between the entities.  The 
attributeDataII operation was used to pass the state of the model data structure attribute 
to be recorded in an XML file when it was read or written during the scenario.  The 
defined operations were invoked from the model (see Figure 3-34).   The operation 
implementations were static methods in the associated Java application (see Figure 
3-35).  A snippet of the resulting XML file is shown in Figure 3-36. 
 
Figure 3-33.  Example xtUML Bridge 
 
 
Figure 3-34.  Example xtUML External Call 
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Figure 3-35.  Snippet to Create XML File 
 
 
Figure 3-36.  Sample XML Snippet 
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3.5 Metrics utilized 
This work proposes two metrics, the Top-Level Model Abstraction Metric 
(TLAM) and the Implementation Commonality Metric (ICM) metric.  The TLAM 
metric assesses top-level model abstraction.  The ICM metric identifies the degree of 
commonality within implementations, across implementations in use-cases, and 
between use-cases.   
This work addressed complexity in a manner similar to that which software 
engineering addresses complexity, specifically by utilizing abstraction.  The premise 
was that a top-level model with fewer elements is less complex and more readily 
understandable than a specific implementation model with more elements.  A common 
implementation pattern is likely to be an abstract view which represents multiple 
unique implementation elements.  To reduce model complexity, it is advantageous, to 
maximize the number of common, abstracted implementation patterns, and minimize 
the number of unique elements.    There are two cases of interest to illustrate this 
point, comparing the top-level implementation with a specific implementation and 
comparing the top-level implementations against all the individual implementations in 
a use-case.   
Figure 3-37 illustrates the TLAM metric and the two cases of interest.  The top 
of the figure shows a top-level model with only two elements.  The bottom of the 
figure shows three functionally equivalent implementations, each composed of unique 
elements.  The functionality of the implementations is the same as the functionality of 
the top-level elements.  However, the implementations are different from each other.  
In addition, there are less elements top-level elements suggesting that the top-level 
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elements are at a higher abstraction level. The TLAM for case 1 is a percentage of top-
level model elements to individual model elements.  TLAM is calculated by:  
 
TLAM% = (1-TLME/IME)*100  (equation 1) 
where: 
 TLME is the total number of top-level model elements 
 IME is the total number of  implementation model elements 
 
This perspective identifies the abstraction level of the top-level for a specific 
implementation.  As an example, if the top-level model represented file system 
functions, it could be used to compare the level of abstraction to the NTFS 
implementation.  In the example in Figure 3-37, it is seen that the elements in the top-
level model result in a 67% reduction of the elements when compared to 
implementation 1 (I1), 33% reduction when compared to I2, and a 60% reduction of 
elements when compared to I3.  The concept is that it is advantageous, less complex, 
and easier to understand the fewer abstracted elements of the top-level model versus 
the numerous elements in an implementation specific model.  
TLAM case 2 compares the top-level implementations against all the 
individual implementations in a use-case.  This is a ratio of the individual model 
elements to the top-level model elements.  This perspective identifies the abstraction 
level to all implementations across a particular use-case.  For example, in the file 
system example, this may be comparing the number of elements in the FAT, NTFS, 
and EXT implementations for specific functionality.   Looking across implementations 
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there may be additional increases of abstraction realized in TLAM case 2 since the 
top-level model provides an abstraction for multiple implementations vice one 
implementation.  In the case of the example in the figure, there is a 7:1 reduction.  It 
should be noted that the smallest ratio, will be N:1, were n is the number of 
implementations.  This will be the case when all the implementations and top-level 
model contain the same number of elements.  This will occur when all the 
implementations and top-level model are the same. 
 
Figure 3-37.  TLAM Illustrated 
 
 
The ICM metric is analogous to the reuse leverage metric of [69] and the 
abstraction metric [70].  The elements that these metrics were measuring are identified 
in Table 3-6.  This work argues that the ICM is analogous to the reuse metric and 
abstraction metric and as a result the ICM metric utilizes a similar calculation.  The 
values for all the metrics in the table range from 0 to 1 and are non-dimensional.  In 
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the case of the ICM 0 designates no commonality across implementations and 1 
designates 100% commonality across implementations.   
 
Table 3-6.  Related Metric Types 
Metric Element Type of Interest Other Element Types  
Reuse Leverage  Reused Objects Built Objects which are not 
reused 
Abstraction Abstracted Classes Concrete Classes 
Implementation 
Commonality 
Common Patterns Unique Elements 
 
 The Reuse Leverage metric measures the reuse of components across a 
software project.  The Abstraction metric measures the degree of abstraction across a 
package.  The Reusability Leverage metric determines the reuse of “objects” in a 
software system.  The objective is that if there are fewer “objects” to reuse, there are 
advantages in the costs of developing and maintaining less “objects”.  The abstraction 
metric identified the degree to which concepts were abstracted from the details.  The 
ICM is analogous in that the patterns abstract the details of the unique 
implementations.  The reuse and abstraction metrics are of the form: 
Metric = EoI/TE 
where: 
 EoI are the element types of interest 
 TE are the total elements in the population 
 
Using this form, the proposed ICM for measuring commonality in a single 
implementation or between two implementations can be expressed as: 
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ICM = CIS/TIS    (equation 2) 
where: 
 CIS  is the total number of common implementation structures (e.g. common 
patterns). 
 TIS is the total number of implementation structures. 
 
An implementation structure is the modeled data structure and may consist of one or 
more model elements.  The specifics of how CIS and TIS are determined is dependent 
on how the ICM is utilized.  In each case, it is key to determine the common set of 
structures for the entities which commonality is to be determined.  Figure 3-38 
identifies the three cases in which the ICM metric is utilized.  These cases are: 
 Case 1: Common patterns utilized in a specific implementation. 
 Case 2: Common patterns utilized across a use case. 
 Case 3: Common patterns between use-cases. 
 
Figure 3-38.  ICM Illustrated 
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The application of the ICM equation was as follows:   
Case 1 (single implementation).  In a single implementation equation 2 was utilized 
where: 
 CIS: the total number of common implementation structures in the 
implementation.  The CIS patterns need to be previously defined for this 
calculation.  As an example the common patterns may be those which are 
defined for the use-case.  
 TIS: the total number of implementation structures in the implementation. 
 
The common patterns in which the implementation measured against will need to be 
defined.: In the case of the example in the figure, the implementation consists of four 
model elements, two of which are identified as common.  The resulting metric is 1/2 
 
Case 2 (across a use-case).  Across a use-case of multiple implementations, the metric 
is calculated, utilizing equation 2, by comparing two implementations at a time.  The 
metric is the average of applying equation 2, nC2 times, where n is the number of 
implementations.  More specifically: 
 
ICM =  1/𝑛 ∑  𝑚𝑖=0 CISi/TISi    (equation 3) 
where m =nC2 
In this context: 
 CIS: the common implementation structures across the two 
implementations. 
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 TIS: the total implementation structures between the two implementations. 
This metric can also be applied to additional levels of functionality within the 
implementations.  As an example, in this work, the metric was applied to functional 
groups to provide additional granularity. 
 In the example in the figure, there are three implementations being compared.  
When I1 and I2 are compared, C1 is the only common structure between the 
implementations.  This common structure occurs twice.  In addition, there are a total 
of ten structures resulting in a metric calculation of 1/5 comparing the two 
implementations.    This is repeated for the other two combinations.  The average of 
these calculations result in a value of 2/5 which defines the ICM for the use-case 
 
Case 3 (comparing two use-cases).  Across use-cases equation 2 as utilized where:   
 CIS: the common implementation structures across the use-cases. 
 TIS: the total implementation structures in both use-cases. 
In the example of the figure, the use-cases have three common patterns, C1, C2, and 
C3.  These common patterns occur fifteen times.  There are a total of thirty elements 
which resulted in a metric calculation of ½. 
 
Metric Contributions.  A contribution of this work was the identification of metrics to 
support commonality and abstraction analysis.  This was accomplished with the 
establishment of the TLAM and ICM metrics.   
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3.6 Animation Application Implementation 
A prototype animation application depicting the file creation/deletion scenario 
for the FAT file system was created.  The application showed the key attributes of 
evidence creation for the relevant underlying computational architecture.  The 
application utilized a script generated by executing a model for the given scenario.  
The application provided views to meet the needs of different stakeholder roles.   
The animation application read in the behavioral XML script from the FAT 
scenario.  The application animated the behavioral script.  The animation showed the 
control flow of the operating system by showing the forensic data structures that were 
being read from or written to as the operating system changed states through the 
scenario steps.  The control flow was depicted by an arrow that indicated the data 
structure that was being read or modified.   
The architecture for the animation application is shown in Figure 3-39.  The 
application utilized three XML files that were generated from the model.  The 
initial.xml file provided the initial settings from the model configuration files.  The 
detail.xml file populated data structures to provide additional information as required, 
and the script.xml file provided the detailed steps.     
The animation application consisted of the following functionality: parser, data 
structures, animation logic, and the Graphical User Interface (GUI).  The parser 
extracted the information from the XML files and populated the application data 
structures.  Based on the user-controlled GUI settings and the parsed script, the 
animation logic provided the mechanisms to display the information based on the user 
selections and actions to step through the display.  The GUI provided the requisite 
displays of the animation.  The user was able to select various levels of detail to view 
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via the GUI.  For example, detail information was provide to identify the byte location 
and additional descriptive information on the forensic data structures.   
 
 
Figure 3-39.  Visualization Architecture 
 
A demonstration of the prototype animation application was provided to the 
URI DFCSC.  This demonstration provided a venue for expert review to determine 
how closely the application represented the forensic concepts being modeled and to 
allow feedback on the potential applicability of modeling to the field of forensics and 
stakeholder roles.  
 
Model to Application Contribution.  A contribution of this work was to generate 
computable model artifacts to facilitate the execution of a relevant digital forensic 
animation application. 
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CHAPTER 4 
4 FINDINGS 
This chapter details the findings of this work.  The findings included: 
 Pattern identification (step 4). 
 Functional grouping definitions (step 4). 
 Top-level general models and forensic area profiles (steps 5 – 7). 
 Top-level forensic profile (step 8). 
 Constructive procedure for extensibility.  
 Metric results. 
 Application analysis. 
This chapter discusses the model implementation patterns and functional 
groups resulting from the analysis of the specific models.  The functional groupings 
provided a finer grain decomposition of the functions defined in the scenario use-
cases.  The constructive analysis resulted in the definition of the top-level models 
along with their associated profiles.  Additional constructive analysis of the use-case 
profiles yielded the top-level profile. This overall, repeatable, approach was defined in 
the constructive procedure.  Metrics were recorded to assess the resulting 
commonality across models.  Lastly, the results of the animation application will be 
discussed. 
4.1 Specific model Analysis (step 4) 
4.1.1 Pattern analysis  
The two types of patterns of interest were structural static patterns and 
behavioral patterns.  The static patterns described the underlying architectural data 
structures of the forensic scenario.  The behavioral patterns described the scenario and 
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the resulting control flow as dictated by the operating system or applications, per the 
scenario.  The patterns were derived from analysis of the implementation models. 
4.1.1.1 Forensic static patterns (data structures). 
There were six types of (non-unique) static structures which were identified 
from the analysis of the specific models.  Structure was dictated by the classes and the 
associations between classes. The static structures included: 
 Single Elements. 
 Unordered Lists (Multiple Elements). 
 Ordered Lists (Multiple Elements). 
 Multiple List (e.g. Directory/File System). 
 Pointers to Lists.  
 Amplification of additional data. 
These static structures were further refined by considering the behavioral operations 
that could be performed on these structures and are shown in Table 4-1 as the forensic 
static patterns.  The table identifies the pattern name, the specific structure utilized for 
the pattern, whether or not that the elements in the pattern needed to be ordered, and 
the behavior aspects of the patterns.  The behavior of the pattern was defined by the 
operations that could be performed on the classes of the structure, such as being able 
to add or delete elements or to read/write elements.  It also should be noted that each 
of these patterns could be implemented with or without nested data types.  The nested 
data types provided additional flexibility when modeling complicated data structures.
  
 
8
5
 
 
Table 4-1.  Discovered Forensic Static Patterns 
Pattern 
Base 
Structure 
Ordered Size Varies Modifiable Example 
Static unordered elements 
non-modifiable (SUEN) 
Singe Element no no no FAT Boot Sector 
Static unordered elements 
modifiable (SUEM) 
Single 
Element 
no no yes OS and Applications 
 Static unordered list  
modifiable (SULM) 
Ordered List no no yes Collection of Clusters/Blocks 
 Static ordered list  
modifiable (SOLM) 
Ordered List yes no yes Bitmaps 
Dynamic unordered list  
modifiable (DULM) 
Unordered List no yes yes 
Process and Process File 
Descriptors 
Dynamic ordered list  
modifiable (DOLM) 
Ordered List yes yes yes Process List 
DynamicOrderedTableMo
difieableOfDynamicUnor
deredTablesModifiable 
(DOTMDUTM) 
Multiple List 
(Directory) 
yes yes yes Directory 
Multiple Types Reference 
(MTR) 
Pointers-to-
lists 
no N/A N/A 
NTFS:MFTEntry , 
EXT:Blockgroup 
Detail Detail no no no N/A 
  
86 
 
In describing the forensic patterns, it is useful to describe each of the structures on 
which the forensic patterns are based and to identify how these structures are refined 
by the addition of operations and nested data types. 
Single elements structure.  The single elements contain one or more key-value 
pairs, as shown in Figure. 4-1.  The key of the key-value pair has a unique string that 
is associated with a value that is of type string.  The single element structure has the 
characteristics that it typically does not have multiple instantiations and is static, that 
is, the number of key-value pairs cannot be added or deleted.  Figure 4-2 shows the 
Single Element pattern with nested key-value pairs.   In general, any of the structural 
patterns may consist of a nested collection of key-value pair collections.  In the case of 
the diagram, the SingleElement has an attribute kvGroup that had a type of KeyValueGroup 
that itself has one or more attributes of type KeyValue .  The notion of nested types 
allows modeling flexibility of more complicated data structures.  Note that OCL 
constraints are shown to ensure that there are no duplicates in the key-value pairs and 
key-value groups. 
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Figure. 4-1.  Single Elements Structure 
 
 
Figure 4-2.  Single Element Structure Nested Data Types 
 
 
 As an example, this pattern applied to the FAT boot data structure is shown in 
Figure 4-3.  In the case of the FAT boot sector, the order of values is not of concern.  
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This example was the SUEN pattern which was mapped to the table from [55].  The 
number of attributes did not change (i.e., it remained static).  In addition, these values 
were startup values and were not modifiable. 
 
 
Figure 4-3.  SUEN Example 
 
 
Lists structure.  Lists are modeled as collections, as depicted in Figure 4-4.  
Lists modeled utilizing nested datatypes are depicted in Figure 4-5. The list collection 
class is composed of one or more Node elements.  The Node element consisted of a 
key-value pair.  The key is a unique string that is associated with a value that is of type 
string.  There are three characteristics of a list that are of interest, ordered versus 
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unordered, constant size versus variable size, and whether the values of the key-value 
pair are modifiable.   
 The unordered list is a collection of 1-to-many of the associated type Node.  
There was no ordering of elements imposed by this structure.  Data structures in which 
order does not matter would utilize this model representation.   
In other cases, the list needs to be an ordered.  The ordered list contained an 
association of the collection class to one initial entry element.  From this initial 
element, the next Node can be reached via the next association.  This is analogous to a 
linked list.  There is an inherent order in this representation enforced by the structure 
of the model.  As an example, the bitmap data structure was modeled as an ordered list 
to allow the next element in the sequence to be selected.  Specifically, in the EXT 
block bitmap, when allocating blocks to a file it was optimal to choose the blocks 
sequentially to prevent fragmentation.   
If the collection membership needs to change, the operations to either add or 
delete Nodes are required.  An example of a list that never change size is the FAT 
table.  An example of a list that requires new members to be added or deleted from the 
collection is the list of operating system processes in a process list. 
Also of note was that this pattern consisted of two types of constraints.  In the  
Figure 4-4, there was a required constraint to ensure that the collection class contained 
a set, ensuring that each Node was unique by having a different key in the key-value 
pair.  The second type of constraint was a transitive closure constraint which ensures a 
Node is not visited more than once to prevent infinite loops. 
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Figure 4-4.  List Structures 
 
There were no common patterns in this work whose list implementation only 
needed their data structure values read and not modified.   The list data structures 
needed to be modified or be written with a new value.  For example, the EXT block 
bitmap not only required a read operation but also required a write operation to either 
set or reset its value. 
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Figure 4-5.  List Structures with Nested Data Types 
 
Multiple lists structure. A multiple list pattern is shown in Figure 4-6.  This 
pattern consisted of an ordered list and an unordered list, which were used for the 
directory structure in the FAT file system use-case model and the file system structure 
in the browser use-case model.    
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Figure 4-6.  Multiple List - Directory Structure 
 
 Pointer-to-lists structure.  This pattern showed the association of multiple 
tables of different types and defined groupings of associations.  This pattern was used 
to model tables that had rows with lists of different types within the row as shown in 
Figure 4-7.  This pattern grouped different types of lists.  Each type of lists could have 
zero or more instances.  An example would be the NTFS MFT.  Each row contained a 
set of attributes, with each attribute being defined by a list of types.   
 
Figure 4-7.  Pointers-to-lists Structure 
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Detail structure.  This pattern utilized a UML dependency class to document 
additional information which was associated between the classes on both ends of the 
association (see Figure 4-8).  This pattern was not related in modeling the underlying 
forensic data structures, but was utilized to provide additional detail between data 
classes within the model.  Figure 4-9 provides an example in xtUML to show how the 
dependency class was utilized.  In the figure there is a dependency class BootDetails on 
the association which links BootSector and OS.  The association class contained the 
specific model forensic attributes which were read by the OS.  The data types for these 
attributes are identified in Figure 4-10.  The actual values of these forensic attributes 
were not defined in the data type; rather, the attribute data types were defined by the 
Details type.  The Details types defined attributes providing specific information 
which may be of interest a more technically advanced digital forensic stakeholder.    
 
 
Figure 4-8.  Detail Structure 
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Figure 4-9.  Detail Pattern FAT Example 
 
 
Figure 4-10.  Details OAL Snippet 
 
4.1.1.2 Dynamic patterns (Scripts).   
The dynamic patterns in this work were utilized to show the control flow of the 
scenario.  The thread of control was scripted to the specific scenario and was at a very 
abstract level.  The three primary dynamic patterns (shown in Figure 4-11) seen in this 
work were: 
 Case 1: Initial state to final state via a sequential set of intermediated states. 
 Case 2: Initial state to a target state and remain in the target state. 
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 Case 3: Transition from the initial state to a target state back to an initial 
state. 
Case 1.  Given a start event, the state machine started at an initial state and 
stepped through a sequence of states until the end state was reached.  Each state 
contained a set of steps (implemented in OAL) that resulted in a corresponding set of 
attributes to be modified to achieve the desired end-effect of the state, after which 
there was a transition to the next state. 
Case 2.  Given an event, the initial state transitioned to the appropriate target 
state.  The target state was the final state. 
Case 3.  Given an event, the state machine transitioned to the appropriate target 
state, executed the requisite set of steps, and transitioned back to the initial state. 
 
 
Figure 4-11.  Dynamic Patterns 
 
The Dynamic Pattern implemented per forensic use-case for this work is shown in 
Table 4-2. 
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Table 4-2.  Dynamic Pattern Cases 
Use-Case Dynamic Pattern Implemented By 
File Systems Case 1 OS 
Browsers Case 3 Browser App 
RAM Case 2 App 
RAM Case 3 OS 
 
 
4.1.2 Functional grouping definitions.   
The functional groups were defined by further analyzing the functional area 
use-cases based on what was discovered during the development of the specific 
models.  The requisite high level functionality of the underlying computational 
mechanism was identified along with the relevant data structures.  The functional 
groupings are a key component in defining the top-level models. 
File systems.  Based on the analysis of the scenario, the file system 
functionality could be further decomposed into four major grouping, the 
RetrieveFSMetaData, AllocateToDUStorage, DetermineStorageLocation, and AccessDirectory.  
These functions are operating system functions.  The RetrieveFSMetaData retrieves the 
file system metadata.  The operating system utilizes this information to determine how 
to interact with the file system, such as determining the location of file system data 
structures.  AllocateToDUStorage either reads or allocates contents to memory.  The 
DetermineStorageLocation, determines the data units to which file contents are to be 
written.  The AccessDirectory function accesses the directory to access the meta data of 
the file.  Table 4-3 maps the file system use-case activities/functions to the supporting 
functional grouping functions.  
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Table 4-3.  File System Use-Case Extension 
Use-Case Activity/Function Supporting Functional Group 
AllocateFile AccessDirectory 
AllocateFile RetrieveFSMetaData 
AllocateFile DetermineStorageLocation 
AllocateFile AllocateToDUStorage 
DeleteFile AccessDirectory 
DeleteFile RetrieveFSMetaData 
DeleteFile DetermineStorageLocation 
DeleteFile AllocateToDUStorage 
 
Table 4-4 shows the mapping of the specific file system forensic data 
structures being modeled to the functional grouping of this work. 
 
Table 4-4.  Key Forensic Data Structures Mapped to Functional Groups 
  FAT NTFS EXT 
RetrieveFSMetaD
ata 
Boot 
sector,FSINF
O 
$Boot Superblock, 
group 
descriptor 
DetermineStorage
Location 
FAT $Bitmap,$STANDARD_IN
FORMATION,$DATA,$A
TTRIBUTE_LIST 
Inodes, inode 
bitmap 
AcessDirectory Directory 
Entries 
$FILE_NAME,$IDX_ROO
T,$IDX_ALLOCATION,$
BITMAP 
Directory 
Entries 
AllocateToDUStor
age 
Clusters Clusters  Blocks 
 
Figure 4-12 shows the extended use-case incorporating the additional 
implementation functions resulting from the data structure groupings that emerged 
through the analysis.  These are operating system functions that are contained in the 
file system component in the use-case.  These functions extend the use-cases 
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AllocateFile and DeallocateFile activities/functions and were added using the include 
relationship shown in the extended use-case. 
 
 
Figure 4-12.  File System Extended Use-Case 
 
Browser.  The decomposed functions for the functional groupings for the 
browser use-case are, FSStoreRetrieve and DbStoreRetrieve.  These functions simply 
store information gathered by the browser when visiting web sites and downloading 
files.   
The file system representation in the browser model did not need to be 
modeled to the same level of detail that was required for the file system use-case.  The 
browser model needed only show how the file system could be traversed to gain 
access to the specified file.  Table 4-5 maps the RAM use-case activities/functions to 
the supporting functional grouping functions.   
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Table 4-5.  Browser Use-Case Extension  
Use-Case Activity/Function Supporting Functional Group 
Browse FSStoreRetrieve 
Browse DbStoreRetrive 
Download FSStoreRetrieve 
Download DbStoreRetrive 
EnableCookie FSStoreRetrieve 
EnableCookie dbStoreRetrive 
 
Figure 4-13 shows the updated browser scenario use-case, which includes the 
additional decomposed model functionality.   
 
 
Figure 4-13.  Browser Extended Use-Case 
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RAM. The decomposed functions for the functional groupings for the RAM 
use-case are, ManageProcesses, CreateSocketConnections, MapSockets, and 
ManageConnections.  ManageProcesses provides the functionality to create processes 
and to provide the equivalent process information that would be displayed by a 
standard process list command line.  The ManageConnections function provides the 
equivalent network connection information which would be displayed by a standard 
network connection list command line.  The CreateSocketConnection function allows 
the application to create a socket network connection.  The MapSockets function 
creates an entry in the process handle table for a socket.  This table is utilized to 
associate a process with a network connection.  Table 4-6 maps the RAM use-case 
activities/functions to the supporting functional grouping functions.  
 
Table 4-6.  RAM Use-Case Extension 
Use-Case Activity/Function Supporting Functional Group 
ListProcesses  ManageProcesses 
StartApplication ManageProcesses 
CreateNetworkConnection  MapSockets 
CreateNetworkConnection CreateSocketConnection 
ListNetworkConnections ManageConnections 
 
 The updated scenario diagram, with the additional decomposed functionality, 
is shown in Figure 4-14.  The diagram included the OS_ProcessManager component 
functionality to address a process life cycle, which included process creation and 
scheduling.  Also, the diagram included the OS_IOManager component functionality to 
address network communication. 
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Figure 4-14.  RAM Extended Use-Case 
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4.2 Top-level model & profile constructive analysis (steps 5-7). 
The following sections identify the requisite analysis and validation in 
determining the top-level models and the associated profiles. 
 
4.2.1 File systems 
The top-level model for file systems was based on the file system functional 
groupings.  Table 4-7 maps the functional groupings for the top-level model and the 
implementation data structures patterns used to implement the top-level model. 
The file system top-level model is shown in Figure 4-15.  The associated data 
structures from the top-level model are identified in Figure 4-16.  The DataUnitManager 
is a collection class of DataUnit, which models disk storage.  The Directory is a 
combination of lists used to model the directory structure and is also a collection class 
of DirectoryEntry.  DirectoryEntry contains file information along with references to the 
appropriate set of DataUnit .  The FSMetaStore contains the file system’s metadata.  The 
OS contains the state machine. 
 
Table 4-7.  File System Functional Group/Components to Patterns 
Supporting Function/Component Pattern 
RetrieveFSMetaData SUEN 
DetermineStorageLocation DOLM 
AccessDirectory DOTMDUTM 
AllocateToDUStorage DULM 
Application SUEN 
OS SUEM 
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Figure 4-15.  File System Top-Level Model 
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Figure 4-16.  File System Top-level Model Data Types 
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The operating system dictated the control flow for the file system scenario.  
The behavioral states and definitions are shown in Table 4-8.  The state machine is 
shown in Figure 4-17.  The states represented the set of steps to perform the scenario 
based on a file “save as” event or a “delete file” event.  The “save as” event was 
initiated at the word processing application.  The delete event was the result of moving 
the file to trash.  In the file system scenario, the state machine went through a 
sequential set of steps for allocation.  Based on an operator-initiated delete, the state 
machine also traversed through a sequential set of states.  These states were the same 
across all the implementations, however, the ordering of the states differed.   
 
Table 4-8.  File System States 
State Description 
Initial Initialize scenario 
BootStructDataDeteremined File System Meta Data is read by operation 
system 
FileLocDetermined Determine location of target directory and file 
location within the directory 
FileEntryCreated Create initial file entry structure and/or fill in 
initial information for the file entry 
WriteContents Determine location to write contents/write 
consents 
FileSaveComplete  Intermediate state between actions 
DeleteInitialized Initialize data structures for delete 
DirectoryEntryCleared  Clear/Unallocated  file structures in target 
directory 
AllocationStructuresCleared Clear/Unallocated file allocation data structures t 
Complete End State 
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Figure 4-17.  File System Top-Level State Machine 
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The key profile elements for the file system static profile are identified in 
Table 4-9.  The static profile was derived from the top-level static model and is shown 
in Figure 4-18.  The profile stereotypes were consistent with the top-level classes 
which represented the forensic data structures.  In addition, the data types that were 
consistent with the forensic attributes were utilized to define the data types of the tags 
for the stereo types.  The tag data types (see Figure 4-19) were categorized as related 
to either evidence, operating system, and applications.  In addition, a time data type is 
identified along with enumerated types for file system identification.  Constraints were 
added to ensure unique elements in collections and to address transitive closure to 
prevent infinite loops.  The dynamic profile for the states of the state machine is 
depicted in Figure 4-20. 
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Table 4-9.  File System Profile Definition 
Top-level Element Top-level 
Type 
Profile Element Stereotype, Data 
Type, or Tag 
Profile Meta 
Class 
Description 
OS Class OS Stereotype Class  Operating System. 
Application Class Application Stereotype Class Application whose content is 
stored in a file.  
FSMetaStore Class FSMetaStore Stereotype Class Contains the file system meta 
data. 
Directory Class DirectoryRoot Stereotype Class  Contains other directories or 
directory entries.  Top level 
directory is the “root”. 
DirectoryEntry Class DirectoryEntry Stereotype Class  Contains the meta information 
for the files or subdirectories. 
FileDataUnitRef Class FileDataUnitRef Stereotype Class A set of references to 
DataUnit(s) where the file 
content is written. 
DUAllocationMecha
nism 
Class DUAllocationMec
hanism 
Stereotype Class  Data structure which keeps 
track of available data units. 
AllocationCell Class AllocationCells Stereotype  Class An individual cell/element in 
the DUAllocationMechanism. 
DataUnitMangement Class DataUnitMangem
ent 
Stereotype Class The mechanism which 
manages the access to the file 
system data units. 
DataUnit Class DataUnit Stereotype Class  An individual data unit which 
can be written to.  Typically a 
cluster or block. 
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Figure 4-18.  File System Static Profile 
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Figure 4-19.  File System Profile Tag Types
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Figure 4-20.  File System State Behavior Profile
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4.2.2 Browsers 
The browser scenario was at a higher level of abstraction than the file system 
use-case.  The same model was used across all three implementations; the differences 
were with respect to the ways in which the scenarios were initially configured.  With 
regard to the file system, file paths and files names were different across 
implementations.  Additionally, databases, tables, and table contents had different 
configurations between implementations.   
The mapping of the browser functional groups and the pattern implementation 
is shown in Table 4-10. 
 
Table 4-10.  Browser Functional Group/Components to Patterns 
Supporting Function/Component Pattern 
DbStoreRetrieve/ DataBase Unique 
FSStoreRetrieve DOTMDUTM (Directory) 
Browser SUEM 
OS SUEM 
 
 
The browser top-level class diagram is shown in Figure 4-21.  The associated 
data types for the top-level diagram are depicted in Figure 4-22.  The major classes in 
the class model were the WebBrowser, the Database, the OS, and the classes 
representing the files system (Directory and File) that were collection classes.  The 
Downloads, History, and Cookie data types are consistent with the forensic attributes.  
The WebBrowser application contained the state machine.   The browser state machine 
is shown in Figure 4-23. 
 
  
 
1
1
3
 
 
Figure 4-21.  Browser Top-Level Model 
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Figure 4-22.  Browser Top-Level Model Data Types 
 
  
115 
 
 
The state machine states and their descriptions are in Table 4-11.  The 
application state changed based on one of three transition events:  
 Download: An artifact has been down loaded. 
 History update: Change in URL.  
 Cookie update: Cooking information is stored. 
After the transition change has been completed the application goes back to its typical 
state, ActionProcessed.   
 
Table 4-11.  Browser States 
State Description 
ActionProcessed This is the typical state, waiting to process a user 
request 
HistoryUpdated When a URL is visited the history is updated 
CookieUpdated When cookies are enabled and a site is visited 
which utilizes cookies, cooking information is 
updated 
DownloadUpdated When a user performs download, the download 
information is updated 
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Figure 4-23.  Browser State Machine 
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The key profile elements for the Browser profile are identified in Table 4-12.    
The static profile was derived from the Browser top-level static model and is shown in 
Figure 4-24.  The profile stereotypes were consistent with the top-level classes that 
represented the forensic data structures.  The profile also identified OCL constraints.   
In addition, the data types that reflected the forensic attributes were utilized to define 
the data types of the tags for the stereotypes. The tag data types, shown in Figure 4-25,  
were categorized as related to either evidence, operating system, or application.  In 
addition, data types for time and an enumeration for browser types were identified.   
Constraints were added to ensure unique elements in collections and to address 
transitive closure to prevent infinite loops.  The dynamic profile for the behavior states 
is depicted in Figure 4-26. 
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Table 4-12.  Browser Top-level to Profile 
Top-level Element Top-level Type Profile Element Stereotype, Data 
Type, or Tag 
Profile Meta Class Description 
Directory Class Directory Stereotype Class 
 Directory.  Starts at 
“root”. Contains File(s). 
File Class File Stereotype Class 
 File. Contains contents.  
Has metadata associated 
with File. 
Content Class Content Stereotype Class Content of file. 
Browser Class Browser Stereotype Class 
 Web browser 
application. 
OS Class OS Stereotype Class  Operating System. 
Database Class Database Stereotype Class 
 Database.  Contains 
Tables. 
Table Class Table Stereotype Class  Contains Row(s). 
Row Class Row Stereotype Class 
Contain data and has 
meta data on row. 
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Figure 4-24.  Browser Use-Case Profile 
  
 
1
2
0
 
 
 
Figure 4-25.  Browser Tag Data Types 
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Figure 4-26.  Browser State Behavior Profile 
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4.2.3 RAM 
The RAM scenario was at a higher level of abstraction than the file system 
use-case.  Due to the lack of available information for implementation specifics, the 
class and state machines were a high level, generic, abstract, textbook-configuration 
that represented all the configurations.  The top-level dynamic and static models for 
RAM were the same as the implementation specific models.  The differences between 
the models were in the terminology used to describe the specifics of the process and 
network evidence.  These difference were reflected in the data types.  The patterns 
associated with the functional areas, applications, and OS are shown in Table 4-13. 
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Table 4-13.  RAM Functional Group/Components to Patterns 
Supporting Function/Component Pattern 
ManageProcesses DOLM 
CreateSocketConnection DULM 
ManageConnections DULM 
MapSockets DULM 
CommandLine SUEN 
Application SUEM 
 OS SUEM 
  
 
The RAM class diagram for the top-level model is shown in Figure 4-27.  The 
association data types for the RAM top-level model are identified in Figure 4-28 and 
represent the key forensic attributes.  The OS contained the state machine and dictated 
the control flow.  The state machine for the OS is shown in Figure 4-29 and the state 
machine for the Application is shown in Figure 4-30.  The viewing tool modeled the 
output of the OS commands that provided either a list of running processes or the open 
connections.  The ProcessManagement class was a collection of processes executing on 
the machine.  The collection process (i.e., process tree) was implemented as an 
ordered collection.  The process had an association with a FileDescriptorTable (i.e., 
handle table) that was a collection of available handles.  In this case, the model 
represented socket file descriptors.  The Socket was associated with a 
CommunicationsObject which is a member of the ConnectionManagement collection 
class.  The application itself was associated with the OS and if it was a network 
enabled application it was associated with Socket. The OS was in a SteadyState unless 
there was an action: 
 to add a process (e.g., application starting up), or 
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 to add a socket (e.g., application establishes a network connection). 
These actions occurred when a new application instance was created.  The 
application had a state machine, and depending on the initial startup parameters, was 
either in a network enabled state or not.  The OS states and descriptions are listed in 
Table 4-14 and the application state machine states and descriptions are listed in Table 
4-15. 
The run of the scenario set up various instances of an applications and modeled 
the output of the viewing tool.  The system process list or open connection list was 
shown by executing the View Tool, which was representative of command lines for 
processes and network connections. 
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Figure 4-27.  RAM Top-Level Model
  
126 
 
 
 
Figure 4-28.  RAM Top-level Model Data Types 
 
Table 4-14.  RAM OS States 
State (OS) Description 
SteadyState Operating system waiting state 
ProcessAdded Process is added to process list 
SocketAdded Process is added to process list and a socket handle is 
created 
 
 
 
Figure 4-29.  RAM OS State Machine 
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Table 4-15.  RAM Application States 
State (Application) Description 
NotInit Application not initialized 
Executing Application is initialized and is not a 
network enabled 
ExecutingAsNetworkClient Application is initialized and is  network 
enabled 
 
 
Figure 4-30.  RAM Application State Machine 
 
The key profile elements for the RAM profile are identified in Table 4-16.  The 
static profile was derived from the RAM top-level static model and is shown in Figure 
4-31.  The profile stereotypes were consistent with the top-level classes which 
represented the forensic data structures.  In addition, the data types that reflected the 
forensic attributes were utilized to define the data types of the tags for the stereotypes. 
The tag data types, shown in Figure 4-32, were categorized as related to either 
evidence, operating system, or application.  In addition, data types for time and an 
enumeration for Application types were identified.  Constraints were added to ensure 
unique elements in collections and to address transitive closure to prevent infinite 
loops.  The behavior profile for the OS states is depicted in Figure 4-33 and the 
behavioral profile for the Application behavior states is depicted in Figure 4-34.
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Table 4-16.  RAM Top-level Model To Profile 
Top-level Element Top-
level 
Type 
Profile Element Stereotype, 
Data Type, 
or Tag 
Profile 
Meta 
Class 
Description 
Application Class Application Stereotype Class  Application whose process and 
network connections are of interest. 
OS Class OS Stereotype Class  Operating System 
ViewingTool Class CommandLineTool Stereotype Class  Command line tool to either get 
process list or open connections. 
Socket Class Socket Stereotype Class  Provides API for application to receive 
and send information. 
CommsSocketObject Class CommsSocketObject Stereotype Class  Represents the network stack between 
the application Sockets to the network 
“wire”. 
ConnectionManagement Class ConnectionManagement Stereotype Class Maintains a list of network connections. 
ProcessMangement Class ProcessManagement Stereotype Class  Maintains the list of processes. 
Process Class Process Stereotype Class  An individual processes.  Contains the 
forensic information of interest. 
FileDescriptorTable Class FileDescriptorTable Stereotype Class  Contains the network handles for the 
process of interest. 
FileDescriptor Class FileDescriptor Stereotype Class  Individual file handle for a network 
object. 
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Figure 4-31.  RAM Static Profile 
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Figure 4-32.  RAM Profile Tag Data Types 
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Figure 4-33.  RAM OS State Profile 
 
 
 
Figure 4-34.  RAM Application State Profile 
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4.2.4 Model equivalence 
The analysis determined that the top-level models were equivalent to the 
implementation specific models in all three forensic areas of this work. 
File systems.  The file system top-level model was equivalent to the file 
system implementation specific models.  The results for the model equivalent scripts 
are shown in Table 4-17 for the file system area.  The only significant anomalies were 
due to the differences in when time was recorded across the file systems, specifically 
with regard to the type of time stamps (e.g., modify, access, create, write) and where 
the time stamps were located (e.g., at the file entry level or the parent directory level).  
For the implementation differences, the forensic attribute for time was at a too low 
level of abstraction.  If the time attribute was deemed to be of significant interest, it 
would need to be re-evaluated and the appropriate level of abstraction would need to 
be defined.  For instance, perhaps the time on file updates might be of interest. 
There were also some minor difference in the order in which the forensic 
attributes were generated, however this had no effect on the forensic attribute values.   
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Table 4-17.  File System Equivalence 
Specific 
Model 
Common Steps 
with Top-Level 
Model 
Total 
Steps 
% Step Delta 
Comments 
Equivalent? 
FAT 30 38 78 Due  to how FS 
implements times 
Yes 
EXT 31 37 82 Due to how FS 
implements times 
Yes 
NTFS 34 38 89 Due to how FS 
implements times 
Yes 
 
Browsers.  The browser top-level model was equivalent to the browser 
implementation specific models.  Since the specific models and top-level models were 
the same, the differences in the model were in the scenario configuration of the file 
system and data base models in the browser implementation.  
There were a few instances where the location of these attributes could not be 
found in the existing documentation.  It was verified that the relevant information does 
exist in the browser, however, the available documentation in the proprietary 
implementation was not readily available.  In addition, there was slight variance in 
how the implementations stored the information as variables in the data base.  For 
example, in the download forensic attributes, for the name of the downloaded 
document, one browser included the path in its attribute and another implementation 
used separate variables for name and for path.  Overall, there was an approximately 
94% mapping between each of the specific implementation attributes and that of the 
browser forensic attributes.   
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RAM.  The RAM top-level model was equivalent to the RAM implementation 
specific models.  Since the specific models and top-level models were the same the 
differences in the model were in the scenario configurations with regard to the process 
attributes and network attributes.  As with the browsers, the documentation for the 
specific proprietary implementations was incomplete.  However, there was only one 
instance in which the attribute name could not be determined.   Overall, there was an 
approximately 95% mapping between each of the specific implementation attributes 
and that of the RAM forensic attributes.   
 
4.3 Digital forensic profile constructive analysis (step 8) 
The static digital forensic profile was constructed by integrating the forensic 
use-case profiles.  Since the behavior profiles were use-case specific they did not 
change from the area behavior profiles and are not addressed in this section. The 
description of the profile elements are provided in Appendix A. 
The resulting profile packages are depicted in Figure 4-35 and further described 
in Table 4-18.   
 
Figure 4-35.  DF Profile Package View 
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Table 4-18.  DF Profile Package Description 
Profile Package Description 
DFOS Operating system stereotypes.  
DFFileSystem File system stereotypes.  
DFApplication Application stereotypes. 
DFRAM RAM stereotypes. 
DFData Types Data types supporting profile stereotypes 
DFEvidenceTypes Evidence data types supporting profile 
stereotypes. 
 
The operating systems were common across the categories.  As a result, the OS 
stereotypes were transferred from the area profiles to a new OS profile as shown in 
Figure 4-36. The OS profile contains all of the OS elements that were required by the 
area forensic profiles.  In this profile the OS is composed of: 
 ProcessManager: partially equivalent to the OS in the RAM. 
 IOManager: partially equivalent to the OS in the RAM. 
 FileSystemManagerDetailed: equivalent to the OS in the File System Profile. 
 FileSystemManager:  equivalent to the OS in the Browser Profile. 
To show that stereotypes can extend other types of UML meta-classes, OsUserCall, 
OsKernalCall, and ApiCall stereotypes extending the Association meta-class are 
included in the OS profile.   
Since the browser itself is an application, the Browser profile was the basis for 
the Application profile.  This was accomplished by incorporating stereotypes from 
both the File System and RAM area profiles in the modeled application.  The various 
application stereotypes were inherited from the Application class (see Figure 4-37).   
  
136 
 
The DF File System Profile, shown in Figure 4-38 is similar to the associated 
File system area profile, without the operating system and application stereotypes.  
Likewise, the DF RAM Profile, Figure 4-39, is similar to RAM area profile, without 
the operating system and applications stereotypes. 
Lastly, the profiles DF Evidence Types, shown in Figure 4-40, are directly 
related to the forensic attributes.  The DF Supporting Types, shown in Figure 4-41, 
provided the data types for application types, OS, and specific data types for the 
detailed file system model.  In addition, a DFTime data type was identified with 
enumerations to be used in identifying specific configurations.  It should be noted that 
OCL constraints were included to: 
 Ensure that collections elements had unique keys. 
 Transitive closure to prevent infinite loops. 
 Time attributes ranges were defined.
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Figure 4-36.  DF OS Profile 
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Figure 4-37.  DF Application Profile 
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Figure 4-38.  DF File System Profile 
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Figure 4-39.  DF RAM Profile 
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Figure 4-40.  DF Evidence Types 
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Figure 4-41.  DF Types 
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4.4 Metric results 
Figure 4-42 identifies the TLAM results.  The file system top-level model 
resulted in the greatest reduction in TLAM case 1.  Both the browser and RAM top-
level models had a reduction of 3 to 1.  The second TLAM case shows that there is a 0 
percent reduction of elements when the browser and RAM top-level models are 
compared to each of their respected implementations.  In the browser and RAM use-
cases, the model implementations and top-level models are the same, therefore there is 
no reduction seen for TALM case 2 and the minimum reduction ratio is seen for 
TLAM case 1.  On the other hand, the file system top-level model shows significant 
reductions in elements when compared to the NTFS and EXT implementations.  This 
was reflective in that the complexity of the NTFS and EXT implementations are 
significantly greater than the complexity of the top-level model equivalent.  The 
results indicated that for implementations which were 100% common were at a 
maximum level of abstraction.   
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Figure 4-42.  TLAM Results 
 
Figure 4-43 identifies the metrics results for ICM.  The set of common patterns 
were defined as the patterns utilized in at least two of the use-cases.  ICM case 1 
shows that all the implementations had a relatively high degree of common pattern 
usage.  The browser and RAM use-cases had no variation for the ICM metric.  This 
was due to the implementations being identical.    The file system implementations 
showed a variation in the metric since their implementations vary. 
ICM case 2 shows that the browser and RAM use-cases have a value of 1 
showing maximum commonality, which was as expected.  On the other hand the file 
system use-case shows less than 100% commonality.  Investigating the file system 
use-case further, the ICM was applied to three aspects of the file system use-case 
implementations, the application, the operating system, and the functional groups.  
The calculation for these aspects were: 
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 Operating System: 1 
 Application: 1 
 Functional group: .72 
 
The operating system and applications were common across implementations.  
Further investigation of applying ICM case 2 to the functional groups is shown in 
Figure 4-44.  The Data Unit Allocation functional group was relatively simple 
functionality representing the data units of the file system.   This group was simply 
modeled as a collection across all the implementations.  Other than naming (e.g. 
blocks, clusters), the model implementation of this simple functionality is common 
across the implementations.  There were also similarities in the FS Meta Store 
functional group that also has relatively simple functionality in that primarily 
functions as a store.  However, there was a significant differences in implementations 
in the Data Unit Allocation and Directory functional groups which were reflected in 
the resulting ICM case 2 calculation. 
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Figure 4-43.  ICM Results 
  
 
Figure 4-44.  ICM File System Results 
 
The results for ICM case 3 is shown in Figure 4-45.  The results show that 
there is commonality between the use-cases.   
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Figure 4-45.  ICM Case 3 (Across Use-Case) Results 
 
Metrics summary/conclusions. 
The file system use-case top-level model showed significant reduction of 
elements with the abstracted top-level model when compared to the detailed models.  
However, this was not the case with the browser or RAM use-cases since the 
implementations of the specific models were the same as the top-level model. 
Commonality was seen throughout the implementations within the forensic 
areas and across implementations.  This commonality varied significantly but 
increased as the level of abstraction increased.   The metrics results were supportive 
that there was commonality across the models which was consistent with what was 
expected by inspection of the implementations.  
An important observation was that a higher degree of commonality between the 
implementations corresponded to a smaller reduction in the number of elements in the 
top-level model when compared against the specific model implementations.  It was 
also observed that less commonality between implementations was an indicator of 
increased complexity across the use-case.  This is suggestive that there is an inverse 
relationship between commonality and complexity, as measured by the level of 
abstraction between the top-level model and implementation models.  Another 
significant observation is that the commonality in model implementations is 
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suggestive that there is commonality in the actual computational mechanisms which 
were the subject of the model. 
 
4.5 Constructive procedure for model extension 
The constructive method to extend top-level models and/or extend the digital 
forensic profile is outlined in Figure 4-46. 
 
 
Figure 4-46. Constructive Method 
 
This work has demonstrated this constructive method was repeatable by developing 
the top-level models, the profiles, and the updated use-case diagrams for the three 
scenarios on which this work was focused. 
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There are three possible cases in which this constructive method would be 
utilized: 
Case 1: Adding implementations to an already existing use-case. 
Case 2: Abstraction level changes.  
Case 3: Adding a new forensic use-case. 
 
Case 1.  Adding new implementations may result in further refinement of the 
top-level model and possible modifications to the profiles.  The new implementation 
would have been developed utilizing the existing modeling objectives and would start 
on step 2..  After implementation, the transformation script for the new model 
implementation would need to be developed, executed and used to validate model 
equivalency.   
Case 2.   A change in abstraction would have required a change in the use-case 
scenario and forensic attributes starting at step 1.  This may also result in an 
alternative use-case top-level model and possible modifications to the profiles. 
Case 3.  A new use-case would result in all the steps to be exercised.   A new 
top-level model and use-case profile would result along with potential changes to the 
overarching forensic profile. 
 
4.6 Application analysis 
Visual animation description.  The GUI depicted the application, operating 
system, and the various file system data structures, which included, directories, FAT, 
boot sectors, and clusters.  The display, without detailed information, is shown in 
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Figure 4-47.  The additional GUI details which provide the higher fidelity for a more 
advanced stakeholder is shown in Figure 4-48. 
The animation showed the component that determined the thread of control 
and the data structure which was the focus of the thread of control for a given time.    
The thread of control was typically an application or operating system component.  
The initial conditions were set for the relevant attributes of the directory, FAT, cluster, 
application, and operating system model elements.  The initial state was configured by 
the initial configuration scripts.  There were four different scenarios demonstrated for 
the use-case.  The initial configuration varied for each of the scenarios; the other 
aspects of the model (e.g., class diagrams, state machine diagrams, OAL, and the 
application source code) required no change.  During the animation, the user selected 
the “Next” button to go to the next step of the animation.  The next animation step 
occurred when a forensic attribute of the data structure changed, when the source of 
the thread of control changed, or when the target forensic data structure changed.   The 
method chosen to show the next step was to show an arrow between the source and 
target components.  The top-level description of the next step action was on the link.  
A more detailed description of the next step action was provided at the top of the 
display.  These detailed descriptions utilized the detailed model pattern previously 
identified.   For stakeholders requiring additional information, the following display 
options were available: 
 Details: Provided the underlying detailed information for a particular 
forensic attribute, such as a top-level description and the bit position. 
 Location (Loc): Provided the cluster location of the data structure. 
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 Notes: Provided additional descriptive information, such as, column headers 
of the Directories. 
 Evaluation (Eval): Provided additional information, such as slack. 
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Figure 4-47.  Application View (No Details) 
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Figure 4-48.  Application View (Detailed) 
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Expert review.  It should be noted that the examiners were exposed only to the 
application and not the other aspects of this work.  As they observed a demonstration 
of the application they were asked to comment on the following: 
 Would this type of animated application be useful (as illustrated by the 
FAT file allocation/deallocation) from an educator/student or analyst 
stakeholder role?   
 Would this type of animated application be useful for other digital forensic 
stakeholder roles?   
The comments provided by the expert reviewers are summarized in Table 4-19.  
Comments were received on following topics: domain complexity, level of detail, 
model sources, roles, and how to improve the tool.     
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Table 4-19.  Expert Review Comments 
 
 
 
Comment 
Topic 
Comment (Paraphrased) Reviewer 
Domain 
Complexity 
There are uncountable implementations. Even with the file system, there are a lot of versions. 2 
Level of Details Operating system routines may be doing additional actions which may be of interest. 2 
Model Sources Implementation details are often not known, the only insight is what is published via research or by 
reverse engineering. 
2 
Model Sources What authoritative source is a model based on?  Why should the model be trusted?  2 
Roles For the Student/Educator role, could be used to enhance teaching. 1 
Roles Could be used to help remind/refresh analyst on how to do a procedure. 1 
Roles  Judge/Jury: There is too much detail in the application for a judge and jury 2 
Roles Trained analyst already has accepted forensic tools. 2 
Roles Did not see how would be useful for analysis, but good for teaching.  1 
Application 
Improvement 
Adjustments to displays recommended to facilitate in understandability (running list of previous 
steps, "not a fan of the arrows").   
2 
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Analysis of comments. 
Complexity/Detail.  The models can be extended to address the particular 
implementation of interested utilizing the constructive method.  Extensibility was one 
of the objectives of this work.   The extensibility is discussed in terms of breadth, the 
ability to add new implementations or new versions of extending implementations, 
and in terms of depth, adding additional model fidelity.  For example, extensibility 
was shown by modeling three implementations per scenario.  Modeling to various 
degrees of detail was demonstrated with the relatively low level modeling of the file 
system area as opposed to the very high granularity modeled for the RAM area. 
Sources.  This work utilized sources that are generally used in an educational 
setting or are publically available.  For the purpose of this work these sources were 
adequate to demonstrate the utility of modeling.  Nevertheless, the model could easily 
be adjusted to include other sources.  For example, one reviewer provided more 
authoritative sources for the file system area.  The use of these sources would have 
resulted in minor changes to the data type naming, but would have had no overall 
effect on the focus of this work.  However, it should be noted that in modeling efforts, 
for the model to be trusted, it is important to obtain agreement from the model 
stakeholder on the set of sources on which the model is to be based. 
Roles.  The indication that this type of tool could be beneficial to facilitate 
understandability in digital forensics was encouraging.  The focus on the types of 
stakeholders to whom this work would be useful was limited to the educational role, 
possibly due to the lack of functionality of the demonstrated application.  Perhaps 
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showing different views or providing more advanced visualizations would have 
provided additional insight into how modeling could be beneficial for the analysis role 
or other forensic stakeholder roles.  In addition, models can be developed to support 
other application types.  For example, models can be queried and used as a database to 
retrieve configuration information or could be used with applications which are based 
on artificial intelligence (AI) engines to make inferences or to find patterns in 
collected data. 
Application improvement.  The recommended improvements would be useful 
from both an educational perspective and potentially to assist an expert analyst. 
In sum, it was found that modeling could be used to develop applications that 
would be of use to an educator.  The feedback from experts in the field was mixed 
about whether the tool would assist those in other forensic roles. 
 
4.7 Findings summary  
The overall findings address what was found during implementation, test, 
analysis and expert review.  The associated finding for the objectives are as follows: 
 
Facilitate learning and analysis application.  An application was developed 
to provide an animation utilizing artifacts generated by the model.  The detail pattern 
was utilized to provide additional detail for the more technically advanced 
stakeholders. 
An issue that came up during the expert review, which was also encountered in 
the development of the specific models, was determining the authenticated sources to 
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utilize.   The availability of the details on the devices and components to be modeled 
were limited.  From a stakeholder perspective, if the correct authenticated sources are 
not utilized, the stakeholder may not have trust in the model.  The root cause of the 
issue of limited source information is that when new implementations are introduced 
to the marketplace, a significant amount of research to identify what is important from 
a forensic perspective is required.  In one extreme case, the implementations are 
proprietary and the relevant details need to be determined.  In these cases, research is 
performed to reverse engineer the design so that forensic techniques can be developed.  
In the other extreme case, the source code is available and therefore everything is 
known.  However, this is at a much lower level of abstraction that needs to be 
understood, which requires significant research to identify what is important from a 
forensic perspective.  Regardless, research needs to be conducted before a model can 
be created. 
The expert review identified that the animation application could be useful in 
an educational setting.  The approach was not as positively received for an analyst 
stakeholder roles, but there were some thoughts on how the approach may be useful to 
the analyst. There were also concerns with regard to other stakeholder roles which 
would need to be addressed. 
 It can be concluded that modeling can have the potential to facilitate 
applications to enhance digital forensic understanding.  The question that this work did 
not fully satisfy was that multiple stakeholder roles could be addressed by providing 
different abstraction levels.  
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Reduced complexity.  The four findings which relate to the complexity objective 
for the constructive method are as follows: 
 There were nine static patterns and three dynamic patterns found.  
 Top-level models were developed for the three use-cases. 
 Model equivalence was shown utilizing transformation.   
 Metrics provided model commonality and model abstraction measures. 
The discovery of model implementation patterns was an indicator that there are 
commonalities across actual implementations.  The development of the top-level 
models demonstrated that a top-level abstract model could be used to describe 
different implementations and to reduce complexity.  It was shown that the 
implementation specific models could be transformed to the top-level model. These 
results provided an indicator that an abstracted top-level model can be constructed to 
describe different unique implementations by abstracting out how the implementations 
are common.  
The metrics suggest that there is an inverse relationship between commonality 
and complexity, as measured by the level of abstraction between the top-level model 
and implementation models.  In addition, the commonality in model implementations 
which was quantified by the metrics, is suggestive that there is commonality in the 
actual computational mechanisms which were the subject of the models. 
 
 
The degree of abstraction increased as the level of commonality increased.   
This is seen with browser and RAM use-cases which were modeled at a higher level of 
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abstraction than the file system model and substantiated with the TLAM metric.  
There were commonalities identified across model implementations within use-cases 
and across use-cases.  The ICM provided a relative measure to identify additional 
areas in which to investigate potential common functions across implementations.   
Extensibility.  Extensibility of the constructive method was verified in that its 
steps were repeatable.  Extensibility of a top-level model was shown within each use-
case through the addition of three implementations.  The addition of three use-cases 
demonstrated the extensibility of the digital forensic profile.   
DF UML profile.  A digital forensic profile was constructed from this work.  
The elements of the profile can be traced to implementation details.  The profile was 
systematically constructed from top-level models that were constructed from 
implementation-specific executable models. 
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CHAPTER 5 
5 CONCLUSION 
5.1 Summary 
Digital forensics is complex in that there are a combinatorically explosive 
number of types and configurations of digital devices and the components of which 
they are composed.  In addition, there is a wide range of technical skill required of 
digital forensic stakeholders, depending on their roles in their organizations.  This 
work utilized software engineering techniques based on executable models to identify 
two approaches to manage these digital forensic complexities.   
The first approach was to manage the complexity by identifying commonalities 
across implementations to provide a single abstracted view of these implementations 
in a top-level executable model.  The top-level model was utilized to develop three 
use-case profiles.  The three use-case profiles were integrated to construct the digital 
forensic profile.  The digital forensic profile would extend software modeling 
terminology to terminology that is meaningful to individual digital forensic 
stakeholders.  In addition, a method was identified and demonstrated how the top-level 
models and the digital forensic profile could be further extended.  Another result from 
this approach was the introduction of new metrics to quantify model abstraction and to 
identify commonalities between implementations.  The second approach was to utilize 
artifacts generated from the execution of the model to provide a visualization 
application of evidence creation.  This visualization would help the targeted 
stakeholder to better understand the complexities of a particular digital forensic 
scenario.  These two approaches could be utilized to facilitate the application of 
software engineering-based modeling holistically across the digital forensic domain. 
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5.2 Conclusion 
Aa a result of this work, the initial questions can be addressed.  There is 
commonality across actual device and component implementations.  That is, there is 
utility in applying software engineering modeling techniques to digital forensics for 
managing complexity and promoting understandability.  In addition, the potential 
exists to develop an approach applying software modeling holistically across the 
digital forensic domain.  This conclusion is based on all the stated objectives of this 
work:  
1. Addresses domain complexity by utilizing model artifacts to facilitate the 
development of applications for learning and analysis which support multiple 
digital forensic stakeholder roles.  
2. Address domain complexity by providing a top-down view and to find 
commonality patterns across implementations. 
3. The models are extensible to address the introduction of different 
implementations and implementation types.  
4. Construct a digital forensic domain specific UML Profile for digital evidence 
creation which can be used for future modeling efforts. 
 
The animated visualization application utilizing the behavioral script of the 
executable model addressed the first objective.  The application showed information at 
varying levels of detail for various scenarios.  DFCS staff reviewed and commented 
on the visualization application.  The outcome of the review was that the model-based 
application could be useful for understanding to the stakeholders in an educational 
environment.  The application was able to show various levels of detail, however, the 
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expert review brought up concerns with how the application would support the analyst 
and other stakeholder roles.  
Identifying common patterns across implementations addressed the second 
objective.  These patterns suggested that there were commonalities across the actual 
implementations of components and devices which are of interest to digital forensic 
stakeholders.  These patterns were used in the development of the top-level models for 
the three use-case scenarios.  The abstraction level of the top-level model was 
quantified in metrics.  The top-level models provided an abstract description of the 
different implementations.  The pattern commonality within a use-case scenario and 
across use-case scenarios was quantitatively captured in the metrics.   
A repeatable, documented, procedure to extend the top-level models and 
digital forensic profiles addressed the third objective.  Extending the top-level model 
was verified by adding implementations to the use-cases.  Extending the top-level 
profile was verified by combining the profiles of each use-case.   
The digital forensic profile addresses the forth objective.  This UML profile, if 
utilized, would support future digital forensic modeling efforts. 
5.3 Limitations 
This work only demonstrated utility for one stakeholder group, educators.  The 
application developed for this work contained features to provide additional details 
and some additional features targeted to the analyst role.  However, feedback from 
expert reviewers in the analyst community indicated that it was not clear how this 
particular type of application would be useful for the analyst or other stakeholder 
roles. 
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This work utilized open source tools.  During the timeframe of this research 
was being conducted, xtUML had a significant pedigree and support for the 
development of executable models.  However, xtUML is not strictly UML compliant 
and did not support the requisite UML features required for this work.  As an example, 
it does not support OCL and profiles.  To address the need to develop profiles, a 
second environment, Papyrus, which is UML 2.5 compliant was used for the profiling 
aspects of this work, meaning that two modeling environments were used in this work.  
However, the two Open Source projects have started collaborating to develop a 
Papyrus-xtUML environment. 
The utility of the top-level models or the utility of profiles was not evaluated 
with digital forensic stakeholders.  This work focused on identifying why and how 
software engineering modeling concepts could be employed to digital forensics.   
Assessing the potential utility and impact of applying modeling in the digital forensic 
domain was beyond the scope of this work. 
There are a combinatorically explosive number of digital forensic scenarios 
along with a practically uncountable number of configurations.  As such, this number 
of scenarios addressed by this work was infinitesimally small.  This work focused on 
the computational mechanisms within one device in one forensic area at a time.  It did 
not investigate more complex scenarios utilizing multiple devices.  In addition, 
addressing virtual environments would be of interest.  Additional work will need to be 
completed to determine whether the approach in this work can be scaled up to address 
additional implementations, use-case scenarios, and forensic areas. 
The implemented application only showed one aspect of how modeling can be 
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used from an application perspective, a simple animation.  Implementing a more 
sophisticated animation on additional model scenarios would provide additional 
insight into the utility of this approach. 
The focus of this work was to show how evidence was created.  There could be 
other aspects of digital forensics in which modeling could be used.  For example, the 
information in the model could be used to reason about evidence validity.   
Patterns were only touched on in this work and only simple patterns were 
identified.  To gain a better understanding of commonality, all significant data 
structures used in implementations would need to be represented in a model.  
The metric results are suggestive that commonality and complexity are 
inversely proportional.  This result was not rigorously proven.  
5.4 Next Steps 
This work provided a starting framework for applying software engineering 
modeling techniques to digital forensics.  The next steps would include: 
 Assess whether the constructive method scales up.  
 Evaluate the utility of top-level models and profiles with digital 
forensic stakeholders. 
 Add enhanced visualization techniques to target specific stakeholders. 
 Determine if modeling can support other types of applications. 
 Validate that complexity and commonality are inversely proportional.  
 Address additional stakeholder roles. 
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A variety of additional use-cases would need to be modeled to assess whether 
the approach scales-up.  The constructive method could be assessed for extensibility as 
follows: 
 Add additional forensic areas and associated use-cases, 
 Add implementations to an existing use-case scenario, and 
 Model a different level of abstraction for an existing use-case. 
 
As an example, a cloud based scenario involving a combination of network 
analysis may be of interest, since it would involve multiple devices and technology 
areas  (e.g., network, wireless, cloud based services, virtualization).  Adding additional 
implementations to existing use-case scenarios would provide additional insights on 
impacts to the use-cases top-level model.  For example, adding additional file system 
implementations (e.g., HFS+, HPFS, UFS, VMFS, ZFS) to the file allocation/delete 
scenario could further evolve the top-level view.  Adding a different level of 
abstraction to an existing use-case would provide insights into how additional 
stakeholders could utilizing modeling.   
Given the top-level models and resultant profiles generated from this work or 
follow-on top-level models and profiles developed by assessing the constructive 
method, the utility of the top-level models and profiles will need to be addressed.  The 
utility could be addressed in an educational scenario or in using the profiles to 
generate digital forensic models. 
Further investigation of how applications could facilitate understanding for 
digital forensic stakeholders is warranted.  As an example, more advanced 
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visualization techniques may have utility.  In addition, there may be other applications 
of modeling, other than understanding the who, what, when, where, and how of 
evidence creation may be of interest.  For example, the model provided relationships 
between elements and from that perspective the model is equivalent to a database.  
Applications can be developed to provide a front-end query to generate reports of 
information of interest which may be beneficial in an investigation.  Another use is to 
develop applications utilizing artificial intelligence techniques to reason about the 
evidence. 
The relationship between the TLAM and ICM metrics should be further 
investigated to determine if the claim that commonality and complexity are indeed 
inversely proportional.  A proof should be provided to substantiate the claim. 
All future investigations should reach out to stakeholders to incorporate their 
perspectives.  For example: 
 Legal stakeholders, to identify the potential benefit models could provide 
in presenting a case.  In addition, insight could be gained into the ways in 
which visualization techniques may or may not help in the courtroom. 
 Law Enforcement stakeholders (e.g., State Police, detectives), to 
understand the aspects of the evidence that are important and to understand 
the types of applications that would be of use for training purposes. 
 Educational stakeholders, to gain an understanding of whether models 
could be tools for educational purposes.  Moreover, these individuals could 
provide evidence to help develop an understanding of whether formalism 
allows for an exchange of ideas between researchers. 
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 System Analyst stakeholders, to gain an understanding of whether model 
formalism could help address their comprehension of the underlying 
systems or as a means to be able to exchange information.  Additionally, 
these stakeholders could provide valuable insight into the applications that 
would be of use.  Finally, these stakeholders would provide information to 
help develop an understanding of the authoritative sources that could be 
utilized. 
 Tool Vendors stakeholders, to gain an understanding of whether models 
could be used as a method to standardize descriptions of digital forensic 
devices and components.  Additionally, these stakeholders could provide 
information to help to develop an understanding of the utility in developing 
digital forensic model standards that would be beneficial for the digital 
forensic tool community. 
 
5.5 Contributions of this work 
The work provided insights on how modeling would benefit digital forensic in 
addressing some of the complexities of the field.  The unique contributions of this 
work consisted of the following: 
1. Modeled the computational mechanisms involved in the creation of digital 
forensic evidence, 
2. Generated computable model artifacts to facilitate the execution of a digital 
forensic relevant animation application, 
3. Identified a process to construct top-level implementation views of 
computational mechanisms, 
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4. Identified modeling patterns to catalog commonalties in computational 
mechanisms, 
5. Identified metrics to support commonality and abstraction analysis, and 
6. Introduced a digital forensic profile along with a process to extend the profile. 
 
The models developed represented the computational mechanisms for the creation 
of digital forensic evidence.  Since the models were executable, the model’s behavior 
could be captured and utilized by an application to animate the model’s behavior.   
A repeatable constructive methodology was identified to develop and test abstract 
top-level models from implementation specific models.  The constructive method was 
also utilized to construct profiles.  In developing these models, implementation 
commonality patterns were identified for the modeled computational mechanisms.  
The ICM and TLAM metrics were introduced to assess commonality and abstract 
between top-level and implementation specific models.   
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Appendix A: Digital Forensic Profile stereotype descriptions  
 
 Table A-1 provides descriptions of the stereotypes utilized in the constructed 
digital forensic profile. 
 
Table A-1.  Digital Forensic profile stereotype description 
Profile Package Profile Element Profile 
Meta 
Class/T
ype 
Description 
OS OS Class OS with no initial 
connections. 
OS FileSystemManag
erDetail 
Class OS to support detail 
file system models. 
OS FileSystemManag
er 
Class OS with  directory 
structure 
OS ProcessManager Class OS with support of 
processes and 
process lists 
OS IOManager Class OS with support of 
network 
connections. 
OS OsUserCall Associat
ion 
User space call to 
the kernel. 
OS OsKernalCall Associat
ion 
Kernel calls. 
OS ApiCall Associat
ion 
API call between 
components, for 
example a socket 
call. 
Application Directory Class  Directory.  Starts at 
“root”. Contains 
File(s). 
Application File Class  File. Contains 
contents.  Has 
metadata associated 
with File. 
Application Content Class Content of file. 
Application Browser Class  Web browser 
application. 
Application Database Class  Database.  Contains 
Tables. 
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Application Table Class  Database table 
contains Row(s). 
Application Row Class Contain meta data 
on row. 
Application CommandLine Class  Command line tool 
to either get process 
list or open 
connections 
Application Document Class Application whose 
content is stored in 
a file.  
Application General 
Application 
Class Application whose 
process and network 
connections are of 
interest. 
Application Application Class General 
Application.   
FileSystem FSMetaStore Class Contains the file 
system meta data. 
FileSystem DirectoryRoot Class  Contains other 
directories or 
directory entries.  
Top level directory 
is the “root”. 
FileSystem DirectoryEntry Class  Contains the meta 
information for the 
files or 
subdirectories. 
FileSystem FileDataUnitRef Class A set of references 
to data  unit(s) 
where the file 
content is written. 
FileSystem DUAllocationMe
chanism 
Class  Data structure 
which keeps track 
of available data 
units. 
FileSystem AllocationCells  Class An individual 
cell/element in the 
DUAllocationMech
anism. 
FileSystem DataUnitMangem
ent 
Class The mechanism 
which manages the 
access to the file 
system data units. 
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FileSystem DataUnit Class  An individual data 
unit which can be 
written to.  
Typically a cluster 
or block. 
RAM Socket Class  Provides API for 
application to 
receive and send 
information. 
RAM CommsSocketObj
ect 
Class  Represents the 
network stack 
between the 
application sockets 
to the network 
“wire”. 
RAM ConnectionMana
gement 
Class Maintains a list of 
network 
connections. 
RAM Process Class  An individual 
processes.  Contains 
the forensic 
information of 
interest. 
RAM FileDescriptorTab
le 
Class  Contains the 
network handles for 
the process of 
interest. 
RAM FileDescriptor Class  Individual file 
handle for a 
network object. 
DFEvidenceTypes::RAM GenericProcess Tag Evidence properties 
associated with a 
generic process. 
DFEvidenceTypes::RAM GenericNetwork Tag Evidence properties 
associated with a 
generic network 
aware process. 
DFEvidenceTypes::FileSyste
m 
DirectoryEntry Tag Evidence properties 
associated with 
directory entries. 
DFEvidenceTypes::FileSyste
m 
Directory Tag Evidence properties 
associated with 
directory. 
DFEvidenceTypes::FileSyste
m 
FSMetaData Tag Evidence properties 
associated with file 
system meta data. 
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DFEvidenceTypes::Browser CompositeBrows
er 
Tag Composite of 
browser evidence 
properties. 
DFEvidenceTypes::Browser Downloads Tag Evidence properties 
associated with 
browser downloads. 
DFEvidenceTypes::Browser History Tag Evidence properties 
associated with 
browser visits 
(history). 
DFEvidenceTypes::Browser Cookies Tag Evidence properties 
associated with 
browser cookies. 
DFTypes::FileSystem OSData Tag Supports File 
System stereotypes. 
DFTypes::FileSystem FSStructure Tag Supports File 
System stereotypes. 
DFTypes::FileSystem Header Tag Supports File 
System stereotypes. 
DFTypes::OS OSStatus Tag Supports OS 
stereotypes. 
DFTypes StatusVariables Tag Supports OS and 
application 
stereotypes. 
DFTypes::Application::Brow
ser 
BrowserStatus Tag Properties 
associated with 
browser status. 
DFTypes::Application::Brow
ser 
FileData Tag Properties 
associated with file 
system support of 
browser application. 
DFTypes::Application::Brow
ser 
RowData Tag Properties 
associated with db 
table support of 
browser application. 
DFTypes::Application::FileS
ystem 
AppData Tag Properties 
associated with 
generic file system 
for browser 
application. 
DFTypes::Application::RAM AppData Tag Properties for 
generic applications. 
DFTypes::Application Contents Tag Properties for file 
contents. 
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DFTypes DFTime Tag Properties for time.  
Supports numerous 
stereotypes. 
DFTypes DFEnums Tag Enumerations 
supporting use-
cases 
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Appendix B:  Formalism and model aware languages 
 
Basic Theory.  The theoretical basis for this work is based on sets and the relationship 
between sets.  The theory in this section is taken directly from [71]. 
Sets can be mathematically defined using set comprehension.  Set comprehension 
takes the form of: 
{x : S | P(x)} 
This notation says a new set is defined by elements x which are drawn from domain S 
where the elements satisfy a predicate, P(x), such that it is evaluated to be true.  A 
subset consist of elements drawn from anther set: 
X  Y    ( e | e  X    e  Y) 
A power set (e.g.  P(S)  is the set of all subsets as defined by: 
P(S)     (e | e    S) 
A product of two sets, is the set of all possible pairs (x,y) where xX  and yY  and 
can be described by set comprehension as: 
X x Y     {(x,y) | xX    y Y} 
 
A binary relation, R, between sets X and Y is a subset of the product of two sets: 
R    X x Y  
For a given relation, the set of 1st elements is the domain of definition and the set of 
second elements is the image.  Two relations can be mapped to create one relation 
through relation composition.  For example given s:AxB and r:BxC then s;r : A x C .  
More  formally: 
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s;r     (x,z)|(x,y)  s  (y,z)  r 
Model Aware Languages. 
The languages of interest, OAL and OCL are model aware in that they can 
access the model elements.  These languages refer to the elements of a class diagram.  
The modeling of this work consists of navigating across class or collection class 
elements to either read or modify attributes.  Based on the attribute values the control 
flow is identified for the next navigation.   
OCL is not a programming language but a specification language.  OCL can to 
change the model, it can only return values.   OCL is used as either a query language 
or to specify invariants on classes.  
Action languages, such as, OAL are able to instantiate classes, changes class 
attributes, control state transitions and provide rudimentary constructs to implement 
functions.   The action language can provide the control flow. 
 
Set Comprehension and Relations.  A UML class is analogous to the formal concept 
of set comprehension.   A UML class provides a template in which objects are 
instantiated, see Figure B-1.  The objects are analogous to the elements being select 
from a domain.  The objects by definition will have all the predefined attributes of a 
class. 
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Figure B-1. Instance Representation of a Collection. 
 
 An UML association is analogous to the formal concept of a relation.   The 
association shows some type of relationship between two classes and their associated 
objects.  The association contains the arrow which shows how the association is being 
navigated.  The objects of the class in which is being navigated from contain the 
objects of the domain of definition.  The class which is being navigated to are the 
image.   The multiplicity of the association from the source class will be 1 and on the 
target class will be either 1 or * (meaning 0 or more).   In the example, the association 
can be represented in the relation notation as: 
{(x1 , y1), (x1 , y2), (x1 , y3)} 
Where x1 is the object being navigated from and y1 ,  y2  and , y3  are the objects being 
navigated to. 
 
Navigation and selection (OCL and OAL).  Figure B-2 shows and example of 
navigation across classes.  Starting at class X and navigating to class Y over relation s 
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and then navigating from class Y to class Z utilizing relation r, the relation composition 
would be represented as: 
s;r      (x1,z1)|(x1,y1)  s  (y1,z1)  r 
 
Figure B-2.  Navigation example. 
 
In navigation it is often needed to select a particular object in a collection.  For 
example, see Figure B-3.  In this example. The starting context is class X and the 
objective is to select the object from class Z where key has a value of two.  See Figure 
B-4 for the OCL representation. 
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Figure B-3. Navigation and selection example. 
 
 
Figure B-4. OCL Navigation and Selection Example. 
 
The equivalent OAL representation is shown in Figure B-5 and the OAL source code 
representation is as follows: 
select one z related by x->Y[R1]->Z[R2]  where selected.key == 2; 
 
 
Figure B-5. OAL Navigation and Selection Example
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